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2. Preface 
My attention was drawn to the European refining sector when the Austrian oil com-
pany OMV tried to take over the sole Hungarian one, MOL - an attempt that failed in 
2008. After considering dropping the whole topic, I decided to stick to it and to write a 
study on the oil refining industry. 
The industry finds itself at a confluence of economic forces, free competition and po-
litical interference. In addition to necessary changes in structure, output and technol-
ogy, some firms in the industry are subject to political specifications. Politics claims to 
have an influence on the price of fuel, over and above collecting taxes, and to pro-
vide the ordinary citizen with affordable fossil fuels for heating and individual trans-
port. Even the ownership structure of some companies is closely observed: Russian 
oil exploration companies want to enter the European retail markets, seeking to ac-
quire shareholdings in companies already engaged in the retail of oil products. Fol-
lowing the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine or Belarus respectively, the 
reputation of Russian oil and gas companies has been tarnished as a result of their 
failure to guarantee supply to European countries. Some governments may even 
make political capital from pretending to ensure security of supply, retain “national 
champions” and safeguard employment at home. 
All of these facts provide a wide field of activity for investigating the industry. This 
thesis shall come up with a general analysis of the European oil refining industry with 
a focus on six countries. The remit had to be restricted, as analysing Europe as a 
whole would no doubt have gone beyond the scope of this work. The analysis shall 
focus on Austria, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – coun-
tries which constitute, at least partially, a common market in trade with refined prod-
ucts. The way in which crude oil and processed goods are transported and stored will 
be briefly looked at, because they put a constraint on options of firms engaged in or 
considering entering the industry. 
An introduction into technical issues of oil refining will be featured together with chap-
ters that try to combine known facts with facts deduced from theory. The aim is to 
outline the problems of the refining industry, the threats to effective competition and 
the challenges that are set to emerge in the near future. 
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3. Introduction 
This thesis shall provide a review of the refining industry in a selection of countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe that constitute a common relevant geographic market. 
The industry concerned is regarded being at a turning point. In some highly devel-
oped countries of the European Union, demand for oil products is believed to have 
already passed its peak and domestic markets often do not forecast significant 
growth, with the exception of Eastern European countries where motorised private 
transportation rises in tandem with growing prosperity. Fuel prices showing new all-
time highs, though excessively taxed in many countries, give rise to cycling short dis-
tances or using public transport where available. Fuel-efficient diesel-driven cars be-
come popular; the share of diesel consumption as a percentage of the total demand 
for motor fuel is on the rise, already amounting to over 50% in most European coun-
tries. In Austria the share of diesel used amounted to 76% in 2007, with the share in 
Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary reaching over 60%, clearly indicat-
ing the rising demand for diesel fuel. 
The soar in demand for diesel, as well for other low sulphuric products, requires in-
vestment in new technologies, so-called secondary capacities or conversion capaci-
ties, to increase the yield of those products at constant input. Implementing such 
conversion technology raises costs and, by extension, prices for refined products and 
this is not an easy task in an environment that is already quite sensitive due to vola-
tile oil prices and heavy taxation. 
The structure of the industry is dominated by large, highly vertically integrated firms 
that may also have advantages over smaller companies in purchasing crude oil or 
benefiting from economies of scale. Although some smaller national or regional 
champions prevail, there have already been many attempted mergers or takeovers 
with a view to grow and act as a counterweight to the multinational companies. 
Mergers do cause an increase in concentration in the market and may throw up is-
sues like the probability of collusion, foreclosure and other suits for antitrust authori-
ties. Environmental concerns, especially measures intended to reduce the emission 
of greenhouse gases, have resulted in governments issuing strict quality require-
ments for oil products. Furthermore, the refining industry in Europe suffers from over-
capacity; setting up new plants, without closing older ones, can be considered 
unlikely. Oil exporting countries show large investment and are reckoned to be striv-
ing for a larger part of value added chain. 
In this thesis I will analyze a well-defined common market, with respect to the rele-
vant product and geographic market, to examine the industry structure and the com-
petitive environment. 
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3.1. Glossary and list of abbreviations 
AWP Adria-Wien Pipeline 
b/d barrels per day 
bbl, bbl/d Barrel of 159 litres, the unit internationally used for the trade in oil. 
The conversion rate of thousand barrels/day to metric tons/year is: 
1 bpd~> 49.8 tons1 per year, sometimes it’s found rounded up to 
50. 
boe, boe/d Barrel of oil equivalents per day 
Crude oil Rid of light gases, crude oil ready for refining 
EC European Commission 
ELG Erdöl-Lagergesellschaft 
IEA International Energy Agency, founded after the first oil crisis to 
meet future challenges in energy supplies. IEA can be considered 
as an autonomous subdivision of OECD. Members are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
the Slovak Republic (since November 2007), Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. 
LPG Liquefied Petrol Gas 
m tons Million tons 
Downstream Usually downstream activities of an oil company cover distribution, 
wholesale, retail (gas stations) of processed goods to consumers 
or intermediaries. 
Midstream The activities summed up by this term concern transporting crude 
oil and gas. This is about holding and managing pipeline systems 
in pipelines and vessels to the refining spots where the crude ma-
terials get processed. 
Upstream2 This range of tasks in an oil company is not only just about drilling 
for oil/gas. It entails also contractual work, licensing and organiz-
ing joint ventures. Exploration and production of crude oil or natu-
ral gas or LNG (liquefied natural gas). This includes searching for 
oil/gas deposits, making agreements about rights to exploit those 
deposits. Further calculating the profitability of deposits considered 
for exploitation and in the end drilling for oil/gas and bringing it to 
                                            
 
1
 According to the classification BP has made in its „Annual Report and Accounts 2007“, but this clas-
sification is quite similar to other oil companies. 
2
 BP „Statistical Review 2008“ 
10 
the surface. This clearly implies both, on- and offshore activities. 
Activities in the upstream section of a firm also embed managing 
the firm’s reserves and production, the former is to ensure continu-
ity of the latter. Estimating and categorizing the amounts of 
(proved or not proved) reserves is also a matter of controlling the 
production process as well as for book-keeping reasons and in the 
end for making sure the company gets its share from an equity 
shared reserve pool. 
Primary distilla-
tion capacity 
Gives nameplate capabilities of a refining unit in million tons per 
year or thousand barrels per day. Does not necessarily corre-
spond to the real amounts of crude material fed into the process, 
because of stops of production. These stops may occur planned or 
unplanned, because of holidays or to perform maintenance work 
or security checks. Unplanned ceasing of production is quite costly 
and therefore to be avoided. 
Refinery 
throughput 
This figure is not regarding capacities, but the real amount of 
crude material (oil, natural gas) fed into the refining unit. 
Proved re-
serves3 
Estimated quantity of crude oil, natural gas and liquefied gas 
products that can be commercially extracted from already known 
reservoirs with a high degree of certainty (over 90%) and under 
the prevailing economic and operating conditions. 
RRP Rotterdam-Rijn Pijpleiding Maatschappij. The shareholding com-
panies are: Shell Petroleum N.V. 40%, Ruhr Oel GmbH 20%, BP 
Mineralöl GmbH, 20% Shell Deutschland Oil GmbH 10%, Texaco 
Nederland B.V. 10%. The rout goes from Pernis near Rotterdam to 
the German boarder. 
SPSE (Société du Pipeline Sud-Européen) Crude oil pipeline from Fos 
sur Mer to Karlsruhe, supplies interior France refineries, Switzer-
land and Germany. At present the shareholders are: Total 27.84 % 
ExxonMobil 22.00 %, Société de Participations dans l'Industrie et 
le Transport du Pétrole(Held by BP, BASF and Shell) 15.40 %, BP 
12,10%, Shell 10.32% and ConocoPhillips 2%. 
TAL Transalpine Pipeline starting from Trieste, Italy crossing the Alps, 
supplying Austria and by parts of Germany and the Czech Repub-
lic. The operator is a joint venture of oil companies owning shares 
as follows. OMV 25%, SHELL 24%, ExxonMobil 16%, RuhrOel 
11%, ENI 10%, BP 9%, ConocoPhillips 3%, Total 2% 
 National Oil Industry Associations: 
FVMI Austrian Petroleum Industry Association 
MWV German Petroleum Industry Association 
                                            
 
3
 From MOL’s „Annual Report 2007“ p. 218, Glossary 
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Unione Petro-
lifera 
Italian Petroleum Industry Association 
Sappo Slovakian Petroleum Industry Association 
Cappo Czech Petroleum Industry Association 
MAS Hungarian Petroleum Industry Association 
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3.2. An introduction into refining4 
In the course of this work, “refining” will be among the most commonly used terms. 
Hence I would like to introduce the reader to some technical issues in the refining 
industry in order for the process of refining to become understandable and to give 
meaning to bare terms. 
Crude oil is the raw material for a large variety of products: motor fuels, lubricants, 
cosmetics, plastics and cleaning agents. Each of these consumer goods contains at 
least a fraction of crude oil or its distillates. It follows a brief insight into the technical 
issues associated with refining and the choice of location of a refining site. 
When contemplating the best location for a refinery, there are two immediate choices 
available. A refinery can be planned where oil deposits have been found or be placed 
in proximity to the centres of consumption – industrial and densely populated areas. 
Building refineries next to deposits is not sensible in Europe given that the majority of 
crude oil has to be imported. Refineries next to large oil harbours can be considered 
as being the “raw material oriented” European version of premises close to the 
sources of supply. Building refineries at locations where they can be most efficiently 
supplied with crude oil does not necessary imply that all of its produce is locally in 
demand. Small volumes that may be complex to handle (e.g. bitumen that has to be 
continuously heated) have to be transported to the customers. On the other hand, 
densely populated regions may not necessarily be located on the sea: consider the 
region Vienna-Bratislava, or the Ruhrgebiet in Germany. 
Refineries that meet local demand have to be connected to a crude oil pipeline in 
order to achieve economically viable utilization rates. The produce of the different 
products has to be shipped with various different means of transport over small dis-
tances to the customers, whereas supplies of feedstock can be bundled using tank-
ers or pipelines. Over time, a trend towards “consumer-oriented” choice of locations 
has been observed, however both types can still be found: Italy’s refining hot spots 
are in the north of Italy, where most industry is located (consumer-oriented) and in 
Sicily, where huge capacity levels were created to exploit the favourable position in 
the Mediterranean Sea where many shipping routes intersect. 
The most important transformation in the industry has been the change in demand. 
Demand has shifted from heavy sulphuric products towards lighter products: demand 
for diesel soared throughout Europe, but there has also been a rise in demand for 
chemical feedstock. This shift in demand requires refinery operations to be revised 
and investment in conversion capacity. Conversion plants enable the conversion of 
                                            
 
4
 MWV, “Mineralöl und Raffinerien”, Hamburg, 2003 
13 
heavy sulphuric residues into lighter, less sulphuric products and thereby increase 
the recovery of diesel fuel, for instance. 
The design of a refinery has certain characteristics. A large compound is necessary, 
and a direct connection to railroads and/or waterways is favourable. In addition to the 
processing plants, facilities for power generation, storage deposits, laboratories and 
control centres are needed. Although automation of technical processes prevails, 
around 500 people are employed to operate a medium-sized refinery, working in 
shifts. For efficiency reasons, a refinery has to be in permanent operation throughout 
the year, with shutdowns for service and modification works. The capacity of a refin-
ery derives from the first step in crude oil processing – the capacity for atmospheric 
distillation; effective throughput rarely comes up to the so-called nameplate capacity, 
the theoretically feasible throughput.  
There are many different grades of crude oil. Some are light and of low viscosity like 
the Libyan Zueitina which are suited to be turned into fuels and especially middle dis-
tillates (diesel, kerosene). Others come up with high viscosity and sulphur content 
and are more appropriate for the production of heavy fuel oil, bitumen, displaying 
lower recovery rates for middle distillates (only 26% compared to 39% recovery from 
the aforementioned grade). Three different kinds of activity can be distinguished in 
the refining process: 
 Separation 
 Conversion 
 Post-treatment 
Separation 
The first step in processing is the separation of the crude oil from the salt water it 
contains upon arrival, as a result of it being stored in the natural deposits and being 
transported in tankers. The different components are separated by distillation – the 
crude oil gets heated and products with different boiling points get separated. 
Fractionation is done at temperatures between 350 and 370°C at atmospheric pres-
sure in Fractionating columns. Vaporised properties and are separately condensed. 
The lightest products (gases like methane or butane and naphtha) condense at the 
top of the contactor, whereas in the middle of the tower the so-called “middle distil-
lates” are obtained. Middle distillates are the main components of diesel, light fuel oil 
or kerosene. 
Residues of atmospheric distillation are the feedstock for vacuum distillation, the out-
put of which can be blended with middle distillates or are the base material for con-
version plants. 
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Conversion 
The molecular structure of distillates gets changed during conversion: Larger mole-
cules are cracked into smaller ones so that products with lower densities are ob-
tained. “Cracking” can be considered as a collective term for the different techniques 
and procedures available. 
By altering the temperature, the way in which each distillate is used from combined 
production can be changed – 3-5% of middle distillates can, for instance, be blended 
with petrol. However these variations are subject to narrowly set constraints due to 
certain quality requirements. Moreover, while different grades of crude oil can be 
used, lighter oils are more expensive and may not always be available. As a conse-
quence different methods have been developed to crack longer molecular chains into 
shorter ones, thus converting heavy components of crude into lighter ones. 
Thermal cracking 
Residue from atmospheric distillation is overheated under pressure. Molecular bonds 
are broken when temperatures range between 360°C and 500°C. 
Visbreaking is the “mild” option in which lower temperatures are used and the residue 
from vacuum distillation can be employed. “Visbreaking” is about lowering the viscos-
ity of oil. 
Catalytic cracking 
Catalytic cracking results in a higher yield as compared to thermal cracking. This 
means a higher proportion of residue is converted. Aluminium silicate is used as the 
catalyser. 
Hydrocracking 
Hydrocracking is the most technically elegant and flexible method, though it requires 
large investment and it is the most expensive technique. It can be described as cata-
lytic cracking in the presence of hydrogen: the cracked molecules are enriched with 
hydrogen under high pressure. This method necessitates huge amounts of hydrogen 
and most refineries applying it produce hydrogen on site. 
Coking 
Residue from vacuum distillation and thermal cracking can be fractioned once more. 
Gases, petrol, middle distillates and petroleum coke can be obtained. 
Post-treatment 
This term covers the removal of unwanted ingredients, referring to de-sulphurization 
in particular. This step in production is crucial to attach the desired characteristics to 
the products and to meet quality and environmental regulations. De-sulphurization is 
performed in a so-called hydrofiner. In a hydrofining unit, products undergo de-
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sulphurization with hydrogen. By using the Claus-unit afterwards, elementary sulphur 
can be obtained. The process of hydrofining not only lowers the sulphur content of 
the product, but the flammability of the products is also improved.  
Catalytic reforming improves the knock resistance of petrol that would be too low 
even after blending with other components. The fuel grade can be enhanced and the 
required octane number of 95 can be achieved. 
Post-treatment of distillates also includes blending – petrol for instance consists of up 
to 12 components that have to be blended in a way which is even dependent on the 
season of the year. 
There are a multitude of different procedures to fully exhaust the potential of crude oil 
and for further raising the yield of light products. However, I would like to conclude 
the technical explanations because this introduction is only intended to give the 
reader a sense of what refining, the term that is so often used in this work, is all 
about. 
Science will certainly provide innovations to improve efficiency with regard to yield 
and energy consumption. Providing a refinery with power, chemical feedstock and 
water requires great efforts and increasing yield, energy efficiency and flexibility is 
therefore of utmost concern. The above section reveals several implications for the 
industry. At first constraints on the choice of location of a refinery arise: it has to be 
located on the shore or in proximity to a crude oil pipeline with sufficient vacant ca-
pacity to ensure supply with feedstock. Most refineries come up to a capacity of at 
least 50 000 bbl/d (~ 2.5 m tons per year), but even the six fold is common. This indi-
cates that substantial economies of scale can be achieved. 
A company operating in a country located on the sea may have comparative advan-
tages over a firm operating in a landlocked country. As suitable compounds for a re-
fining located on the sea or a pipeline are limited choice of location is a potential bar-
rier to entry into the industry. This can likewise be applied to the complex technology 
necessary for some conversion processes. If they can not be bought on the market, 
considerable expenses for research and development would incur for any entrant.  
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4. Definition of the markets 
According to Motta (2007), there are different approaches to examining the market 
power of firms: The modern way, using econometric techniques to answer the ques-
tion of the profitability of raising prices and a more traditional approach. The latter is 
applied when an econometric model is not feasible and tries to assess markets that 
the firms operate in, defining the “relevant markets”. 
“This requires defining the relevant market”, that is the set of products and 
geographical areas to which the products of the merging firms belong.”5 
The relevant market should be a set of products that resemble each other and mutu-
ally exercise competitive constraints; as a result of which it should cover products 
that are substitutable so the stimulus for the seller to raise prices can be limited. 
4.1.1. The SSNIP Test 
The SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Prices) test guides the 
analysis towards the relevant product and geographic market. The SSNIP or “hypo-
thetical monopolist” test allows both: The definition of the relevant market in terms of 
which products should be covered by analysis as well as the definition of the relevant 
geographical market. 
To implement the SSNIP Test, I will apply Motta’s approach to a greater or lesser 
extent and try to conclude with reasonable market definitions and knowing which 
markets to focus on – my intention was to focus on the refining market and investi-
gate the markets for transport and bunkering of crude and processed oil. The SSNIP 
Test poses the question whether a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to 
raise the price above the current level permanently by 5-10%, a percentage rate 
used by the European Commission. 
If the answer is yes, a rise in price would be profitable. This means that the relevant 
products are not subject to competitive constraints from other products, there are no 
adequate products substitutable enough and the market is found. The products, for 
instance refined oil products, do constitute a separate market and the test is finalized. 
If the hypothetical monopolist does not find it profitable to raise prices, demand shifts 
to other goods which are more or less substitutable. This implies that other goods 
pose a competitive constraint on sellers’ products. The definition of the relevant 
product market should be broadened and the test repeated. The question if a perma-
nent rise in price by 5-10% above the current level would be profitable is asked 
again. If the price increase is profitable, the relevant market will be found. If the an-
                                            
 
5
 Motta (2007), p. 101 
17 
swer is negative more products that pose a potential competitive constraint have to 
be included and the test has to be rerun until a separate market is found. 
4.1.2. Definition of product markets 
Looking at demand and supply substitutability, things get somewhat clearer. Demand 
substitutability shows the reaction of consumers facing higher prices and switching to 
other products or sources of supply. For buyers of refined products that are usually 
traded in bulk loads, this entails buying e.g. motor fuels from another producer or get-
ting involved in refining.  
Supply substitutability describes the circumstances under which a producer has the 
knowledge and equipment to switch production in a short period of time. The com-
petitive constraint does not result from the shift in demand to other suitable products 
but from attracting producers of other goods to enter the market.  
As refined products are standardized, a producer of “other goods” would simply be 
the operator of a refinery in a neighbouring area. If a seller of oil products raises 
prices, operators of adjacent oil refining sites would enlarge their operating area and 
supply the region where prices have been raised – provided that spare capacity ex-
ists and transport costs are competitive. As such, operating areas may overlap 
though it is not evident because prices are not raised above the competitive level. 
Refineries that operate parallel in separate areas can therefore pose a competitive 
constraint on each other. 
In reality, buyers of refinery outputs can only switch to another supplier of the same 
standardized product as switching to e.g. pure biogenetic fuels is not feasible at short 
notice. Even if switching the product would be feasible, the retailer could not sell it 
due to technical restrictions (car engines that would have to be modified or heating 
systems that need a certain fuel). Fossil fuels can not be completely replaced from 
one day to the next. 
However, entry should not incur considerable sunk costs; switching production must 
be easy, rapid and feasible. Entry barriers have to be manageable. Newcomers in 
the European refining sector would have to invest vast amounts of capital into con-
structing an oil refinery. Moreover, in landlocked areas, supply with crude oil has to 
be ensured by a network of oil pipelines in order to achieve sensible capacity utiliza-
tion and exhaust economies of scale. Entry would also cause notable sunk costs, as 
it would require large investments into very specific equipment (distilleries, oil pipe-
lines) that can neither be used for other provisions nor be resold.  
The most practicable alternative may be the entry of a firm that is already engaged in 
refining and has spare capacity in transport, storing and processing, helping to keep 
investment to a minimum. Furthermore, a takeover of existing oil refining premises 
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would be an option as construction of new refineries in Europe is subject to many 
obstacles. Pressure groups, environmental regulation and emission control exacer-
bate such undertakings.  
With regard to the transport of oil and its follow-up products, results are a bit different: 
Transport can be carried out by pipeline, by oil vessel or in tank wagons by rail or 
tanker lorry. Each kind of transport is substitutable with the other, though sometimes 
subject to certain restrictions: The cargo of a tanker can be shipped by trucks pro-
vided that they are available in large numbers but transport on the road is the most 
expensive and dangerous alternative.  
Switching from trucks to transport by rail is easier. Rail networks are quite dense in 
Europe and a complete freight train with tank wagons has a lot of capacity. Existing 
pipeline networks are not available anywhere. They require a lot of capital and are 
mainly used to supply inland refineries – so they can not even be used for transport 
to the consumers or petrol stations. 
A paper by the German association of petroleum industry6 provides the following ac-
count shown in TABLE 1 and TABLE 2. 
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Crude oil vessel    + +   
Pipeline   +  +++ +++ ++ 
Barge   + ++  +++ ++ 
By rail: whole train    ++ +  ++ 
By rail: single wag-
ons    + +  +++ 
Tank truck    + + ++  
         
   +     possible under certain circumstances 
   ++   basically possible    
   +++ possible and common practice   
       not feasible  
TABLE 1: SUBSTITUTABILITY OF MEANS OF TRANSPORT 
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 MWV “Mineralöl-Logistik” (1999) 
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Transport bulk 
loads  1 1 2 3 5 6 
Network infra-
structure  5 6 5 3 2 1 
Flexibility: rela-
tions/amounts 3/2 6/4 5/3 4/2 3/2 1/2 
Quickness  4 3-4 4 2 3 2 
Reliability/Safety  3 1 3-4 2 2 3-4 
Economic effi-
ciency  1 1 2 2 4 5 
          
   1=Most suitable     
   6=Inapplicable        
TABLE 2: ABILITY OF TRANSPORTING BULK LOADS 
 
TABLE 1 and TABLE 2 show that different means of transport are only substitutable to a 
certain extent – but substituting any kind of transport of oil or its follow-up products 
would imply that these goods must be obtained from a crude oil refinery next door or 
doing oil refining on one’s own behalf.  
However producing close to a refinery is not possible everywhere for obvious rea-
sons and refining oil on one’s own may be difficult due to a lack of knowledge and 
technology – or at least inefficient – as the refining business is subject to consider-
able economies of scale (lower production costs at a larger number of units produced 
due to the degression of fixed costs.) and scope. Economies of scope occur when 
profitability can be raised by producing a larger range of products, e.g. to produce 
petrol and diesel, fuel oil and selling the distillation grain as bitumen for the produc-
tion of asphalt. 
It is difficult for new firms to enter into the oil transporting business, with the possible 
exception of tank trucks. This business is in particular subject to extensive safety 
regulation by each country of operation and the United Nations. 
With regard to storing: The demand for storage facilities is neither totally substitutable 
for products nor crude oil as both are transported in very large amounts and cannot 
be consumed or processed all at once. Supply substitution may be somewhat con-
ceivable than when it comes to transport or refining – at least entry is more likely in 
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this market. In any case, substantial sunk costs are unavoidable as big investment in 
special equipment is necessary. 
There are some instruments facilitating the definition of markets: 
Own price elasticity, defined as “the percentage change in the quantity demanded 
that follows a one-percent increase in the price of a product.”7 
A low elasticity can be regarded as an indication of a rather inelastic demand and a 
rise in price is possibly profitable. PVM Oil Associates records elasticities of demand 
of -0.26 for diesel and -0.31 for petrol. These are figures for the short run (< 1 year), 
in the medium or long run demand might be a little less inelastic. Society is fairly de-
pendent on petrol. Envisage a family living on the countryside: Waiving the car is not 
an option when there is no adequate public transport system available. 
The elasticities above indicate that it may be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist 
to raise prices of refined oil. Demand elasticity for storing and transporting oil and 
secondary products is therefore not supposed to be appreciably higher as the prod-
ucts that are bought regardless must be transported and stored. However substitu-
tion plays a major role in transporting: Higher freight rates for tank containers or tank 
wagons may lead to a higher demand for transport on the road, though switching 
means of transport depends on spare capacity. 
Examining cross-price elasticities between petrol and its closest substitutes might be 
an option. However one has to face the question of what the closest substitutes for 
petrol are when it is used for transportation or industrial consumption. Electricity and 
natural gas are the most obvious alternatives, but subject to technological con-
straints. Modifying the engines of millions of cars and buses would be necessary, 
disregarding the fact that fully electric cars do not match petrol-driven ones in terms 
of range and velocity.  
Price correlation tests follow an appealing idea: If products belong to the same mar-
kets, their prices will tend to move in the same way over time. Problems arise if prod-
ucts share a common input. This is exactly the case– the common input is mineral 
oil. Oil and natural gas prices are closely linked and both are commonly used in 
power generation. Considerable spurious correlation would be the outcome; applied 
econometric methods would conclude with contexts that do not exist. 
The last point would be thinking about the characteristics of mineral oil as a primary 
resource and the wide range of follow-up products. However, allowing crude oil and 
its derivatives to be used in the same market is not a plausible approach. It can be 
assumed that they constitute separate markets. My intention to investigate the mar-
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kets for refining oil, transporting and storing it and its secondary products seems to 
go along with theory. What remains is the proper definition of the geographic areas I 
shall focus on.  
4.1.3. Geographic market definition 
Once again, the SSNIP Test poses the question if the hypothetical monopolist of any 
region would find it profitable to increase prices by 5-10%. If the answer is yes, the 
correct geographic market has been found. The task will be finding out if the relevant 
areas coincide with national states or if there are international markets. 
Motta stresses the role of imports or, more generally speaking, the intensity of foreign 
trade in the product in question. Put simply, imports into a country diminish the hypo-
thetical monopolist’s chances of raising prices profitably.  
Since the SSNIP test is not feasible for the above-defined relevant product markets, 
information has to be collected on which areas actually represent a common market. 
Shipment tests can be of valuable assistance. 
Elzinga and Hogarty (1973) suggest analysing data on foreign trade to identify the 
relevant geographic markets. 
“The test has two components, the first to establish whether there is “little 
in from outside” (that is, imports account for a small part of local consump-
tion) and the second that there is “little out from inside” (exports account 
for a small part of local production.”8 
If imports have a considerable share of consumption in a certain region, it follows that 
this region is subject to competitive constraints. The defined geographic area should 
be enlarged. 
Another question is if exports from the area that has been defined as being the rele-
vant geographic market represent a considerable share of production of the product. 
If the answer is yes, exports would be profitable and the producer could compete with 
a company in a market where he is not yet producing. Transport costs and trade bar-
riers do not prevent the manufacturer from enlarging his operation area. 
 
LIFO and LOFI values are calculated as follows: 
 
nConsumptio
Exportsoduction
LIFO
)(Pr
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Consumption results from production minus exports plus imports minus changes in 
stock. Assuming stock being constant, LIFO can also be calculated this way 
 
nConsumptio
LIFO
Imports
1  
 
A LIFO value close to one may indicate that the given region is supplied by domestic 
producers to a large extent. The area under review can then be assumed to consti-
tute an independent market. 
The calculation of LOFI values is done analogously 
 
oduction
Exportsoduction
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and respectively 
 
oduction
Exports
LOFI
Pr
1  
 
A LOFI value close to one indicates that the domestic production is bound for the 
local market and the area can be considered being a self-contained market. 
If LIFO and LOFI values do not reach a certain value, the area the test has been car-
ried out for does not constitute the relevant geographic market. In practise, the area 
under review is widened and neighbouring regions are included. The test is repeated, 
asking if the area in question is subject to competitive constraints originating from 
other regions until both measures get close to one. 
The test is frequently used in analysis because data is easily available and the test 
comes up with good explanatory power. The European Commission takes values 
of 0.8 - 0.99 to define the area in question to be the relevant market. These thresh-
olds however are somewhat arbitrary as the EC even finds separate markets if the 
Elzinga-Hogarty test fails completely or the LIFO test is passed whereas the LOFI 
test fails10. 
Drawing conclusions from results of the test, there are though some restrictions that 
have to be made. Low levels of foreign trade in a product may be the result of re-
gions lacking suitable transport systems connecting each to other areas or prices 
being equal and transportation costs high. If the rise in price is high enough, shipping 
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 In (Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM), Case IV/M774 [1997] O.J. L247/1 
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 Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, Case IV/M315 [1994] O.J. L102/15 
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goods over large distance may become profitable. Furthermore, tariffs or non-tariff 
barriers in trade can be rationales for only a few shipments to occur. In the case of 
refined products, the absence of product pipeline networks, waterways or railroads 
can explain low trade activity. 
Fuels are standardised products; consumers usually do not have a preference for 
“homemade petrol” so if imports are profitable they will be transacted. Substantial 
elasticity of imports is crucial, because imports do not only have to be feasible; the 
quantity imported must also be increased in cases of a price rise to occur in the do-
mestic market. Import elasticity gives the proportional increase in imports if the price 
changes on the domestic market. 
Transportation costs can also point out what limits the proper geographic market 
could have. The ratio of transportation costs and the value of the goods transported 
should be examined. As far as good “refined petrol” is concerned, this is questionable 
if transportation costs really loom large. Most of the crude oil processed in Europe 
has already come a long way: crude oil coming from outside of Europe is shipped to 
Europe exclusively with tankers and is until then more or less exclusively forwarded 
by pipeline to the oil refining units. Consequently, shipping the oil a bit further does 
not really seem to matter. However it is clear that there is little difference in commod-
ity prices (the prices for crude oil) paid on international commodity exchange mar-
kets. Minimizing transportation costs gives, as always, a competitive edge over an-
other company and thus remains a key principle. 
The costs of the eligible means of transport will be a central point in answering this 
question. The EC has declared some markets as being global in cases where trans-
portation costs did not play a major role, e.g. in the aircraft industry case Aérospa-
tiale-Alenia/de Haviland or the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case.  
With this theoretical background, it will be feasible to determine the relevant geo-
graphic markets to be analyzed in detail. The market for transportation of neither 
crude oil nor its follow-up products is not to be limited by national borders. The mar-
ket for storing crude and refined oil is again dependent mainly on means of transport 
required for bulky loads. The market for storage of crude and oil products can be 
considered to be nationwide, as each state has its own provisions for holding emer-
gency reserves that definitely have to be stored within national borders. Each refinery 
or tank farm is able to supply a certain area around; the radius clearly depends on 
transportation costs. PVM Oil Associates figures average weighted costs of 15-25€ 
per ton for 2003. PVM Associates distinguish between primary costs and secondary 
transportation costs: Primary costs are defined as the costs that occur externally be-
fore the crude oil reaches the tank/the refinery (transit costs for pipelines, freight 
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rates for tankers). Secondary costs are the ones that arise for storage or supply in-
house. For 2004 PVM puts them at 6-10€ per ton, excluding overall costs. 
Estimating cost-price proportions could provide further evidence of the shape of rele-
vant geographic markets. I assume that the maximum of both, primary and secon-
dary costs, get realized. I add 5€ to the amount of €35 in order to account for some 
inflation, totalling €40. 
The ratio will be calculated for the entity of a metric ton. Clearly the proportion de-
pends on the price of a ton of crude oil and the EUR/USD exchange rate. A metric 
ton corresponds to 1,165.34 litres and 7.3298 bbl respectively 
June 2008, USD/bbl 132.32, USD 1.5562 had to be paid for € 1 
 
ton/€62.6233298.708.85         %4.6
62.623
40
 
 
May 2009, USD/bbl 54.31, EUR/USD exchange rate: 1.3422 
 
ton/€56.2963298.746.40         %49.13
56.296
40
 
 
Both examples show, even in a situation where the price for crude oil is low, the pro-
portion of transport costs does not exceed the 10% mark by far. A 10% share of 
transportation costs to the value of the good is considered as being “high transporta-
tion costs” by the EC.11 
In order to demarcate a manageable geographic area, the costs of transport from the 
oil refineries to the tank farms and thence to the costumers are of importance. Trans-
port by train can be maintained on a profitable basis for a distance of 1500 km12 ac-
cording to the PVM-study. Taking Vienna as a hub, this would justify considering im-
ports from the west coast of France to Moscow in the east. This definition seems to 
be a little too broad. Besides, transporting oil or fuels by tank wagon is the second 
most expensive means of transport. Reviewing EC decisions on merger issues in the 
refining industry could bring further insight. 
BP/Amoco  
The BP/Amoco case is more or less about petrochemicals. The EC did not consider 
the relevant geographic market to be larger than the European Economic Area, 
though the parties claimed it was worldwide. The arguments were based on a lack of 
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 Case No COMP/M.4173 - NIPPON SHEET GLAS /PILKINGTON and Case IV/M358 [1994] O.J. 
L158/24 accordingly 
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 PVM Oil Ässociates „Der Österreichische Kraftstoffmarkt 2004“ p.136 
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considerable import volumes to the UK with these being done by one of the merging 
parties, AMOCO. Moreover, the EC saw a concentration of essential facilities in the 
hands of one of the two. 
TOTALFina/ELF Aquitaine 
Because of high freight rates for tankers, the majority of refined products sold in 
France come from French oil refineries. Infrastructural provisions determine the defi-
nition of markets. Products that have been sold are shipped from refineries or tank 
farms to the respective surrounding area, sold at 25% on a local and 75% on a re-
gional basis. The market areas are defined by radii around refineries, tank farms and 
pipelines supplying them. The firms regarded the market to be a national one, point-
ing out the inter-regional commodity flows. However the EC rejected this. Spatial 
markets may contain a plurality of overlapping areas but trading areas of tank farms 
in France do not overlap. 
Shell/EON 
The German Bundeskartellamt did not consider it necessary to rebuff the proposal of 
the firms to regard the market for bitumen as being a national one. The firms brought 
the arguments that overlapping markets and therefore a chain of substitution effects 
exist. An increase in price would cause waves of price adjustments, starting from the 
place the price was raised initially. Regional price differences would therefore persist 
only for short time. 
STATOILHYDRO/ConocoPhillips Scandinavia 
The market for retail sales was considered a national one (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden). Owners of gasoline-driven cars tend to use service stations in the vicinity 
of their home or place of work. Overlapping catching areas of service stations create 
knock-on pricing effects and local prices depend on recommended national prices set 
by each company. Finally, most service stations are constrained by a chain of-
substitution effect. 
BP/Mobil 
The EC regarded the market for ex-refinery sales as being constituted by the 1996 
borders of the European Union or including at least the countries concerned by the 
merger. The EC found the following evidence: There has been significant cross-
border trade, price differences were relatively small and mainly due to shipping costs. 
Further pricing policies were decided on a national level and in this instance regional 
/national market shares resembled each other. The non-retail market for refined 
products is supposed to be national: price transparency prevailed and overlapping 
supply boundaries were the case. Exchange and supply agreements between sup-
pliers and buyers that purchase on a national basis were observed. Moreover, the 
EC regards the market for bitumen as national and the one for lubricants as national. 
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Conoco/Phillips Petroleum 
Retail sales of motor fuels were regarded as national markets whereas fuel-refining 
activities and ex-refinery sales represent EU-wide markets. 
PKN / MAZEIKIU  
The core markets of the companies are Poland and Lithuania. Ex-refinery, cargo 
sales were supposed to be confined to EU borders or by the CEE13 countries and 
often Austria and Germany. That was based on the assumption that relatively low 
transportation costs would only have a marginal impact on product prices. In con-
trast: Non-retail sales are regarded as taking place on national markets, retail sales 
have been seen as being the farthest national in scope. In the PKN-Orlen/Unipetrol 
(CZ republic) case, non-retail sales were restricted to a 100-150km radius from each 
point of supply. 
Preem /Skandinaviska Raffinaderi 
The market for crude oil refining was considered being as at least north-west Euro-
pean or Scandinavian, the market for non-retail sales constituted by Scandinavia, 
retail sales as being national markets because of taxation, overlapping catchment 
areas and nationally organised sales. 
To sum up, it can be said that markets for oil products have to be designed along the 
infrastructure that can be found. The market for refining may exceed national borders 
and include the countries surrounding the “core country” of investigation, due to rela-
tively low costs of transportation and (of course depending on the countries involved) 
substantial imports and exports in a competitive environment. 
Non-retail sales are supposed to be national markets because of overlapping mar-
kets and chain-of substitution effects that lead to adaptation of prices. Retail sales 
are considered as being national in scope or even narrower, because end consumers 
of motor fuels frequent service stations in the vicinity of their place of work or resi-
dence. These will be the definitions for the relevant geographical markets, which will 
be confronted with reality when the countries in question are under review. 
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Central and Eastern European countries:, including: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
and Baltic States: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia 
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5. The countries at a glance 
5.1. Austria 
 
FIGURE 1: AUSTRIA 
 
Figure 1 provides a general idea of the Austrian oil industry’s infrastructure. Crude oil 
pipelines are plotted in red, product pipelines in green; the black dot marks the loca-
tion of a refinery. According to the BP Statistical Review 2008, 13.5 m t crude oil 
were consumed in Austria in 2007. 7.642 m tons crude oil were imported. Oil–refining 
activities including semi-finished products add up to 9.09 m tons per year. Total ca-
pacity runs up to 9.6 m tons per year. 
Figure 2 below reveals that Austria’s annual consumption of oil products cannot be 
covered by its capacity. The shortfall has to be imported from abroad as oil products. 
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FIGURE 2: AUSTRIA, REFINING CAPACITY VS. DEMAND 
 
 
Company Refining sites 
Nameplate 
capacity 
Share in 
equity Location 
Distillation 
Capacity 
Total Market 
share  
    in m tons     in m tons   in % 
OMV Schwechat Refi-
nery 10.00 100.00% Schwechat 10.00 10.00 100.00% 
TOTAL      10.00 100.00% 
Source: IEA
14
       
TABLE 3: AUSTRIAN REFINERIES 
 
In TABLE 3 above, it can be seen that all refining in Austria is done at the sole Aus-
trian oil refinery in Schwechat, run and owned by OMV.  
As a landlocked country, it is somehow remarkable that the country runs a refining 
site which is also held to be the largest of its kind in a landlocked country. OMV is 
able to do so thanks to the continuous supply of oil from the AWP (Adria-Wien Pipe-
line). 
Crude oil bound for Austria originates from Kazakhstan (~25%), Libya (23%), Iraq, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia – Austrian crude oil supply can therefore considered as being 
very diverse. Imports from the politically unstable and by extension unreliable Russia 
decreased by 80% compared to 2006. It now accounts for no more than 3.2% of Aus-
trian oil imports. There have been plans to connect the Schwechat refinery to the 
Druzhba pipeline that transports oil from Russia through the Bratislava-Wien-Pipeline 
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(BSP) but these have been postponed following Slovakian objections concerning the 
route of the pipeline. OMV hopes the decision is to be made in 2009. 
Agip Austria (4%), BP Austria (20%) and OMV (76%) are holding interest in AWP. 
The TAL (Trans Alpine Pipeline) is a joint venture of OMV (25%), Shell (24%), 
ExxonMobil (16%) and other major oil companies. 
Calculating LIFO and LOFI in TABLE 4, values of 0.47 and 0.73 respectively are an 
indication that the market for refining products might be larger than Austria.  
 
LIFO     
  2007 2006 
  0.47 0.49 
LOFI    
  2007 2006 
  0.73 0.79 
 
TABLE 4: AUSTRIA, LIFO & LOFI VALUES 
 
In TABLE 5, domestic production is plotted against the imports of various refined 
products. Imports play a big role in Austrian fuel supplies. Further analysis will show 
the direction of trade flows. The LOFI values suggest that Austrian refining capacity 
is bound for providing the domestic market and exports might concern excess pro-
duction of certain produces. 
The supply of oil products for Austria is sketched as follows15; please note that it is 
not congruent with Austrian demand – due to re-exports and stock movements. 
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 Figures from FVMI “Jahresbericht 2007”, there are some variations compared to figures in BP’s “BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008”, but they are small in magnitude. 
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Domestic production vs. Imports 2007 
  Domestic production Imports Total 
  in t in % in t in % in t 
Liquefied Petrol Gas       70,048    35.3%      128,565    64.7%       198,613    
Gasoline       
Super Plus - bio       80,952    65.6%        42,506    34.4%       123,458    
Super Plus + bio       46,477    98.9%            534    1.1%         47,011    
Eurosuper - bio      895,594    60.4%      587,468    39.6%     1,483,062    
Eurosuper + bio      401,561    79.4%      104,444    20.6%       506,005    
Regular gasoline - bio      225,610    62.8%      133,440    37.2%       359,050    
Regular gasoline + bio       87,941    79.4%        22,808    20.6%       110,749    
100% Biogenetic fuel additive               -      0.0%        28,990    100.0%         28,990    
Special gasoline               1    0.0%         6,510    100.0%           6,511    
White Spirit              -      0.0%         5,666    100.0%           5,666    
Middle distillates       
Kerosene         1,020    93.3%              73    6.7%           1,093    
Turbine fuel      603,800    79.1%      159,203    20.9%       763,003    
Diesel - bio      455,570    49.7%      460,586    50.3%       916,156    
Diesel + bio   2.520,890    39.8%   3,812,172    60.2%     6,333,062    
100% Bio diesel additive       49,150    44.5%        61,292    55.5%       110,442    
Fuel oil extra light      608,337    45.8%      720,310    54.2%     1,328,647    
Fuel oil light      344,619    100.0%              -      0.0%       344,619    
Fuel oil heavy      426,895    70.1%      182,506    29.9%       609,401    
Other       
Lubricants      122,139    70.0%        52,263    30.0%       174,402    
Bitumen      410,873    60.5%      267,873    39.5%       678,746    
Other      452,336    93.5%        31,274    6.5%       483,610    
TOTAL 2007   7,803,813    53.4%   6,808,483    46.6%   14,612,296    
2006     7,870,730 52.4%     7,141,616 47.6%     15,012,346    
+ bio refers to motor fuels with biogenetic additives and vice versa    
TABLE 5: AUSTRIA, DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS  
 
Looking at TABLE 5 above, a general decrease in demand can be noticed. What is 
striking is the considerable dependency on imports of middle distillates. Almost half 
of the demand for diesel has to be covered by shipments from abroad. 
The shaded areas show significant import shares, omitting LPG (Liquefied Petrol 
Gas). There is a need for substantial amounts of Eurosuper, particularly for distil-
lates, for diesel and extra light fuel oil. Biogenetic fuel additives also have to be im-
ported to a large extent but as it does not concern refining, this is not relevant for this 
investigation. 
Besides, a part of the demand in bitumen has to be covered from abroad; this may 
be due to the fact that, for the production of bitumen, a heavier, more sulphuric crude 
oil has to be processed. In Schwechat the largest part of crude oil refined belongs to 
the group of “sweeter oils”, which are lighter and less sulphuric. 
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Data from the Federal Ministry of Economy for 200716 show the main origins of Aus-
trian oil products imports: 56% of all imports of products originated from Germany, 
12% from the Slovak Republic, 10% from Hungary and 7% from Italy. 2% of imports 
came from Belgium that can be taken as an indicator for the transit distances ac-
cepted. Most of the imports have been transported by rail. The most important refin-
eries for the supply of Austria listed by PVM Oil Associates GmbH clearly include re-
fineries in the above-mentioned countries.  
PVM cites the refineries in Burghausen (OMV), Ingolstadt (OMV (45%), BP, Agip, 
and PDVSA17), Bayernoil and Karlsruhe, together with Italy’s refineries in Porto Mar-
ghera and Sannazzaro (Agip), MOL’s refineries in Bratislava and Százhalombatta 
and the Kralupy refinery in the Czech Republic. Additionally I would list the IES Man-
tova refinery in Italy that MOL has acquired. 
In 2007, Austrian exports had the following destinations: 29% Czech Republic, 23% 
Hungary, 14% Slovakia and Romania, Bulgaria and France with around 5%. All this 
information about Austrian imports and exports helps in two ways: It acknowledges 
somehow the geographic market definition determined above – the market for refin-
ing is to be a regional one, with national borders not really playing a role, at least 
within the EU. 
When it comes to Austria, its market can not be considered as being separate from 
the markets in Italy and Germany, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, since 
imports cover more or less half of Austria’s demand and these countries are the most 
important exporters of oil products to Austria. Secondly the findings raise the ques-
tion of OMV’s market position in Austria, in some of its eastern neighbouring coun-
tries and in southern Germany. 
5.1.1. Refining 
According to the FVMI (Fachverband der Mineralölindustrie), OMV’s Schwechat re-
finery had a throughput of 8.57 m tons of crude oil (8.49 m t in 2006) and 0.52 m tons 
of semi-finished products, achieving a plant utilization ratio of 91%. The output struc-
ture is sketched in FIGURE 3 below. This single refining site covered about 65% of 
Austrian demand for oil products (2006) according to the Austrian Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
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Output of the Schwechat refinery 
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*Diesel and gasoline were blended with bio fuel components. 
FIGURE 3: AUSTRIA, OUTPUT OF THE SCHWECHAT REFINERY 
 
According to the consumption statistics of the Austrian Department of Trade and In-
dustry, demand for 2007 amounted to 12.01 m tons (2006: 12.79 m tons). There is a 
decrease in demand for gasoline and a rise in demand for diesel. Figures for 2006 
and 2007 can be taken from TABLE 6 below. 
 
in 1000 t 2007 2006 % change 
Gasoline   1.966           1.992 -1.3% 
Diesel   6.321           6.174 2.4% 
TABLE 6: AUSTRIAN DEMAND FOR DIESEL AND GASOLINE 
5.1.2. Transport 
 
Austria’s crude oil supply is dependent on a single pipeline, the AWP Adria-Wien 
pipeline that ends at the Schwechat refinery. The TAL (Transalpine Pipeline) starts in 
Trieste, Italy, and is fed by tankers equipped with a tankage of up to 280,000 tons. 
Crossing the Alps, in Würmlach, Carinthia, the AWP then branches off.  
Austria’s supply with fuel oil, petrol and diesel is ensured directly by tank lorries and 
tank wagons from Schwechat refinery for eastern Austria and by a product pipeline 
ending in Sankt Valentin, Lower Austria, where large storage deposits are located. 
Western Austria is supplied, at least as far as OMV is concerned, from the Bayernoil 
refineries in Ingolstadt, Germany by tank lorry. Vienna International Airport is sup-
plied with kerosene (JET A1) by a pipeline from the neighbouring refining site. 
33 
PLW 
PLW is the abbreviation of the OMV-owned product pipeline to St. Valentin in Lower 
Austria. It makes it possible to deliver to parts of Western Austria and neighbouring 
foreign markets (Germany and the Czech Republic). Its nameplate capacity amounts 
to 1.3 m tons of products per year. 
5.1.3. Storage Deposits 
Many storage deposits in Austria, be it for storing crude oil or for storing products, are 
operated by ELG (Erdöl-Lagergesellschaft m.b.H.). ELG is a joint venture of OMV 
(55.6%), and the Austrian subsidiaries of BP (23.1%), Shell (16.7%) and Agip (4.6%). 
The list below is not exhaustive as there are various other deposits belonging to ma-
jor as well as to non-major oil firms. 
Fürnitz and Zirl (Agip/ ENI), 
Both tank farms for products ensure the supply for Agip’s businesses throughout the 
whole country. 
Korneuburg 
Owned by MOL, capacity exceeds 1000m³ 
Sankt Valentin 
Deposit for products arriving by the PLW pipeline from the Schwechat refinery, 
nameplate capacity: 375,000m³. 
Graz  
OMV owns a rather small 8,100m³ storage deposit that is to supply southern Bur-
genland, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. In addition to this, there are several other 
deposits in and around the city, run by ELG. 
Lannach 
In Lannach, Styria, a large storage facility for crude oil is located. It is run by ELG and 
its tankage comprises 525,000 m³. Substantial shares of the legally determined 
minimum reserves are stored in Lannach; the tank farm is linked to the AWP pipeline. 
Innsbruck, Linz 
Tank farms located in these cities are both operated by ELG, there are additional 
ones run by majors on their own behalf. 
Lobau 
The tank farm situated to the east of Vienna in close proximity to the Viennese har-
bour consists of 87 tanks that can contain up to 1.6 m m³ of predominantly semi-
finished products. The tank farm Lobau is directly connected to the Schwechat refin-
ery via pipes; products are blended on site to become motor fuels. The finished 
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products are forwarded via tank ships and tank wagons. The tank farms in Lobau are 
owned by OMV and some by Shell Austria. 
Lustenau 
Wholly owned by OMV, its task is to provide fuel for customers in Vorarlberg. It is 
supplied by tank wagon from the deposit in Lobau, from Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The capacity amounts to 5,740 m³. 
Salzburg 
Run by TBG Tanklager Betriebsges.m.b.H., a joint venture of BP, Esso and Shell’s 
Austrian subsidiaries. The three firms have an equal stake. >1000m³ 
Trofaiach 
Run by Danuoil, a subsidiary of Roth. MOL holds 50% of the equity. 
5.1.4. Conclusions for Austria 
The dominant position of OMV concerning refining is easy to recognize: all refining 
that is done within Austrian borders is done on behalf of OMV. In 2004 a study had 
been commissioned to investigate if there was any evidence of OMV’s dominant po-
sition jeopardising competition on wholesale and retail markets. No such evidence 
was found and prices have been closely monitored by the government since then. 
Moreover there have been payroll processing contracts of majors18 participating in 
the construction of the AWP pipeline. From 1970 on OMV processed crude oil on 
behalf of the majors using so-called payroll processing contracts. The share pro-
duced for the majors accounted for 15% of total production; they had a contingent of 
2 m tons per year. 
At the end of 2002 the payroll processing contracts of Agip, BP, Esso and Shell had 
with OMV expired. The ending of these contracts gave the OMV the chance of gain-
ing greater flexibility but it also exposed the firm to stronger competition. Products 
that had been forwarded to the west towards the retail outlets of the majors were now 
imported from nearby foreign refineries. 
Regarding demand for the separate products, Austria is highly dependent on imports 
of middle distillates, particularly on diesel. Austria has one of the highest ratios of 
diesel driven cars in the world, with respect to the total number of cars declared. As 
the yield in diesel that can be achieved even after conversion cannot be enlarged to 
any extent, a certain amount has to be produced in other refineries. 
Given that the country is favourably located with respect to transport and surrounded 
by refineries in the neighbouring countries, a quite competitive environment prevails 
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in retailing as well as in wholesaling. About half of OMV’s production is sold to other 
retailers, including the majors on a non-retail basis. This surely intensified competi-
tion, at least when it comes to retailing. Even if there are substantial amounts sold on 
a wholesale basis from the OMV to other oil majors, the abundance of those con-
tracts allowed other companies engaged in retailing to keep an eye on the purchase 
prices they can get. They could meet their demand for their Austrian subsidiaries ei-
ther from the OMV or import from nearby refineries they own. A significant increase 
in imports to Austria for 2004 supports this theory. 
The left axis in FIGURE 4 gives imports in m tons. The right-hand side measures the 
percentage change from the preceding year, with the value being indicated by the 
blue line. After the expiration of payroll processing contracts Agip, BP, Esso and 
Shell were to decide if they continue purchasing at OMV or import fuels from their 
own refineries. The latter seems to be true as the change in import amounts from 
2002 to 2003 accounts for almost 25%. This is the highest increment from one year 
to the other; otherwise the changes are oscillating between -5% and +12%. 
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FIGURE 4: AUSTRIAN IMPORTS AND CAPACITY 
 
As 67% of the motor fuels have been sold over service stations, I find it reasonable to 
dip into the Austrian retail market. The statistics for service stations of the Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber (WKO) beneath outline the situation. OMV has by far the 
most outlets in Austria, followed by BP and Shell, the outlets are listed in TABLE 7 be-
low. 
 
Data from BP and EIA 
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Brand # 
BP 463 
OMV19 707 
Shell 284 
Agip 183 
Esso 177 
JET 142 
MOL 13 
… … 
TOTAL 2802 
TABLE 7: SERVICE STATIONS IN AUSTRIA 
 
Entry into the Austrian refining market is unlikely, crucial supply with crude oil would 
require the construction of a new pipeline. This would further boost the already 
enormous investments that would have to be made. A potential entrant would have to 
fight with OMV for the crude oil transported by the AWP pipeline or would have to 
initiate the bypass to the neighbouring Druzhba pipeline, let alone the enormous in-
vestments that would have to be made. 
Building the link to the Druzhba pipeline may be a risky game in the medium term. 
Russia is looking to avoid delivering their oil through Belarus and Ukraine after sev-
eral conflicts about transit fees and is building a new oil pipeline, ending near Saint 
Petersburg in the Baltic Sea. In fact it is an extension of the Baltic Pipeline System 
(BPS) from Kirishi, which is 115 km south of St. Petersburg, to the harbour on the 
coast of the Baltic Sea in Primorsk. The extension of the BPS is expected to be com-
pleted in September 201220. At this time, a significant decline in volumes delivered 
through Druzhba can be expected – Russia simply saves money by doing so.21 22 
Furthermore, the profitability of importing refined products from abroad decreases as 
distance increases and becomes rather expensive if no transport by rail is possible. 
Transport in tank wagons is the most reasonable in terms of cost/per ton, ranking just 
behind transport by tanker/barge. 
Despite the fact that the majors own storage deposits they can supply from abroad, 
OMV owns the tank farm Lobau, located next to Vienna’s domestic port on the Da-
nube. ELG, which runs many of the deposits in Austria, including the largest – the 
deposit in Lannach – is majority-controlled by OMV. All these facts draw a picture of 
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 Including Avanti and Genol (joint venture with Raiffeisenware Austria, RWA) gas stations 
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 Reuters UK, “Transneft to start work on new Baltic oil pipeline”, 26.05.2009 
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 According to Johannes Benigni, Manager at PVM Oil Associates 
http://www.localglobal.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=769559&template_id=3724“ 
22
 “Baltic Pipeline System Set To Reduce Transit Dependency”, The Saint Petersburg Times, 
11.04.2006 
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a quite dominant position of OMV in the wholesale of refined products, at the same 
time being in close proximity to foreign located refineries owned by competitors. 
 
 
5.2. Germany 
 
 
FIGURE 5: GERMANY 
 
The average citizen in Germany consumes about 1,900 litres of crude oil per year – 
total oil consumption accounted for 108.1 m tons in 2007, with refining capacity total-
ling 119 m tons. German imports of crude oil amounted to 107 m tons, 34 m tons of 
which came from Russia – a third of demand - and 17 m tons from Norway. Great 
Britain delivered 14 m tons, Libya 11 m and Kazakhstan 8 m tons. Domestic produc-
tion of crude oil accounted for 3.4 m tons – which is 3% of total demand and there-
fore rather negligible.  
The demand for products is covered by a quarter to a third by imports from abroad. 
The German refining market has been exposed to several challenges in the past. 
After the first oil crisis in 1973/1974, German refineries had to absorb failures in im-
ports. Having an all time high of 149 m tons of crude oil consumption in 1979, Ger-
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many’s demand for oil was decreasing due to efforts to save and substitute. In 1989 
demand in West Germany amounted to merely 118 m tons. After the German reunifi-
cation, it then increased to 132 m tons in 1996 from which point it began to decline 
again. 
Shrinking demand after the second oil crisis and excess capacity in the refining in-
dustry led to huge problems with operating rates: Total nameplate capacity was 159 
m tons in 1978, while in 1982, West German refineries had been using only 57% of 
their capacity. The number of refining sites had to be reduced radically; in 1990 ca-
pacity amounted to merely 80.6 m tons per year. At the same time, the German refin-
ing industry was faced with the same challenges as the rest of European sector was: 
Growing demands for lighter products, especially for motor fuels and feedstock for 
the chemical industry, at the expense of heavy fuel oil. Conversion plants had to be 
built to meet the demands of the market. The modification of the industry seems to 
have worked: Imports have been on the decline steadily since 1997. 
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FIGURE 6: GERMAN IMPORTS ABSOLUTE AND CHANGES 
 
Data from BP and EIA 
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FIGURE 7: GERMAN CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITIES 
 
 
  in m tons 
Benelux  5,886 
Austria 3,967 
UK 2,791 
France 2,091 
Poland 2,287 
…   
Czech Republic 1,055 
Slovakia 0,06 
Hungary 0,05 
TABLE 8: GERMAN EX-
PORTS OF OIL PRODUCTS 
 
FIGURE 6 shows the development of imports in absolute values and percentage 
points. FIGURE 7 gives the trends of total demand and domestic crude oil distillation 
capacity. Any excess capacity from German refineries, about 10 m tons per year, is 
exported – such exports consist of diesel, heavy fuel oil and petrol for the most part. 
Export figures doubled in the period from 1996 to 2007, reaching a level of 28 m 
tons. Exports were mostly to the Benelux states, Austria, UK and France. Additional 
numbers can be taken from TABLE 8 on the right. The Elzinga-Hogarty test with the 
threshold will get calculated below. 
 
5.2.1. Refining 
In 2007, 14 crude oil refining sites were in operation in Germany and the capacity 
utilization ratio was 91.7%. TABLE 9 provides the details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data from BP and EIA 
40 
TABLE 9: GERMAN REFINERIES 
Obviously Shell is the clear market leader in refining with a market share of 30.16%, 
at least within German borders. Thereon follows BP with a market share of 14.2% 
and ConocoPhillips. OMV, which holds a dominant position in Austria, is among the 
also-rans. However, serious conclusions can not be drawn until market shares for the 
whole geographic area are calculated, as the market for refined products is supposed 
to be a cross-national one. 
Company Refining sites Nameplate 
capacity 
Share in 
equity 
Location Distillation 
Capacity 
Total Market  
share 
    in m tons in %   in m tons  in % 
OMV Bayernoil 12.00 45.00% Ingolstadt 5.40    
  Burghausen 3.40 100.00% Burghausen 3.40 8.80 7.39% 
         
Shell MIRO Mineraloel-
raffinerie  14.90 32.25% Karlsruhe 4.81    
  Rheinland Refinery 17.00 100.00% Cologne 17.00    
  
Refinery  Ham-
burg-Harburg 5.10 100.00% Hamburg 5.10    
  PCK Refinery 12.00 37.50% Schwedt 4.50    
  Erdölwerk Holstein 4.50 100.00% Heide 4.50 35.91 30.16% 
          
BP Emsland Refinery 4.00 100.00% Lingen/Ems 4.00    
  PCK Refinery* 12.90 18.75% Schwedt 2.42    
  Bayernoil 10.00 22.50% Ingolstadt 2.25    
  
MIRO Mineraloel-
raffinerie  14.90 12.00% Karlsruhe 1.79    
  Ruhröl Refinery 12.90 50.00% Gelsenkirchen 6.45 16.91 14.20% 
          
Tamoil Holborn Europa 
Refinery  4.65 100.00% Hamburg 4.65 4.65 3.91% 
          
ConocoPhillips/JET Wilhelmshaven 
Refinery 13.50 100.00% Wilhelmshaven 13.50    
  
MIRO Mineraloel-
raffinerie  14.90 18.75% Karlsruhe 2.79 16.29 13.69% 
          
TOTAL Mitteldeutschland 
Refinery 12.00 100.00% Spergau 12.00    
  PCK Refinery** 12.00 12.50% Schwedt 1.50 13.50 11.34% 
          
Agip/ENI Bayernoil 12.00 20.00% Ingolstadt 2.40    
  PCK Refinery** 12.00 12.50% Schwedt 1.50 3.90 3.28% 
          
PDVSA PCK Refinery* 12.90 18.75% Schwedt 2.42    
  Ruhröl Refinery 12.90 50.00% Gelsenkirchen 6.45    
  Bayernoil 12.00 12.50% Ingolstadt 1.50 10.37 8.71% 
          
Esso/ExxonMobil MIRO Mineraloel-
raffinerie  14.90 25.00% Karlsruhe 3.73 3.73 3.13% 
          
Petroplus Ingolstadt Refinery 5.00 100.00% Ingolstadt 5.00 5.00 4.20% 
                
TOTAL     119.05 119.05 100.00% 
       
  *Shares held via RuhrOel:JV of BP and PDVSA in equal shares     
  
 **AET Betges.: Joint Venture of Total and Agip assume: JV shares 
held in equal shares        
41 
Firstly, I will briefly consider foreign trade in refined products and the structure of 
German demand in products, listed in TABLE 10 
Domestic production vs. Imports 2007 
  Domestic production Imports Total 
  in t in % in t in % in t 
Liquefied Petrol Gas      3,065,000    81.9%        679,000    18.1%      3,744,000    
Gasoline           
Naphtha      8,207,000    53.1%     7,236,000    46.9%    15,443,000    
Petrol     24,289,000    94.4%     1,442,000    5.6%    25,731,000    
Petrol components      2,054,000    85.6%        345,000    14.4%      2,399,000    
Refinery gas      4,166,000    100.0%                -      0.0%      4,166,000    
Special gasoline                  -      0.0%          34,000    100.0%           34,000    
White Spirit                  -      0.0%          30,000    100.0%           30,000    
Middle distillates           
Kerosene             2,000    11.1%          16,000    88.9%           18,000    
Turbine fuel      4,592,000    49.8%     4,626,000    50.2%      9,218,000    
Diesel     35,320,000    91.8%     3,137,000    8.2%    38,457,000    
Middle distillate components         611,000    31.7%     1,318,000    68.3%      1,929,000    
Fuel oil light     14,826,000    75.3%     4,858,000    24.7%    19,684,000    
Fuel oil heavy     11,967,000    90.4%     1,271,000    9.6%    13,238,000    
Fuel oil heavy components      1,702,000    56.0%     1,336,000    44.0%      3,038,000    
Other           
Lubricants      2,431,000    75.2%        801,000    24.8%      3,232,000    
Bitumen      3,500,000    90.0%        390,000    10.0%      3,890,000    
Other      3,632,000    76.7%     1.102,000    23.3%      4,734,000    
TOTAL 2007   120,364,000    80.8%   28,621,000    19.2%   148,985,000    
TOTAL 2006     122,082,000 76.7%     37,075,000 23.3%    159,157,000 
        
Source: MWV "Jahresbericht Mineralöl-Zahlen 2007"      
TABLE 10: GERMAN DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 2007 
 
Import shares are calculated with respect to domestic production instead of domestic 
demand or consumption. Calculation differences arise between inland production, 
adding imports and deducting exports. There are cases where exports exceed the 
sum of production and imports, while positive demand occurs. In any case, the 
method employed gives the same results as the alternative way without causing 
problems. I will keep it this way for all the other countries to follow. 
 
 
LIFO     
  2007 2006 
   0.85  0.80 
LOFI    
  2007 2006 
   0.77  0.78 
TABLE 11: GERMANY, LIFO&LOFI VALUES 
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The LIFO and LOFI values calculated in TABLE 11 above indicate that is almost self-
sufficient with regard to refined products. Although it cannot be regarded as a market 
on its own, the country’s exports represent a vital supply for neighbouring countries 
like Austria. In addition to this, the LOFI value, regarding the importance of exports, is 
below 0.8 and the EC regards countries with one of the thresholds below 0.9 as parts 
of a cross-national market. As a country with many refineries, Germany is certainly 
less dependent on the imports of oil products as Austria is, for example. However, 
there are some products of which substantial amounts have to be brought into the 
country.  
Omitting smaller amounts of special feedstock – white spirit for example – naphtha, 
turbine fuels, middle distillate components and components for heavy fuel oil rank are 
among the list of oil products that get imported on a significant scale. 
The Netherlands is the main country of origin of German imports in products. In 2007 
16.2 m tons was imported by Germany, mainly naphtha, turbine fuel, gasoline and 
light fuel oil, but also considerable amounts of diesel.  
Belgium/Luxemburg share the second place, with imported amounts totalling 3.9 m 
tons, followed by Great Britain and France. 
Imports from Austria, Italy, Slovakia and Hungary do not show up on a large scale, 
though exports may. 
5.2.2. Transport 
More than half of the products are transported by inland water transportation. Ger-
many possesses a dense network of waterways and rivers. The other part of trans-
port of bulk loads is done by rail. Service stations and other smaller retailers clearly 
get supplied by road transport. Crude oil is forwarded almost exclusively by pipeline; 
an increasingly small percentage is transported by rail.  
Crude oil pipelines 
Crude oil is transported almost exclusively by pipeline (98.9% in 1997), at least as far 
as domestic transportation is concerned. This invites the conclusion that German oil 
processing sites are either located by the sea or big rivers, where they get directly 
supplied by large tankers delivering crude oil from abroad or they are supplied via 
pipelines. The routes of the main pipelines are shown in FIGURE 5 at the beginning of 
section 5.2. 
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Germany is supplied with crude oil through four main axes:  
 SPSE from Fos-sur-Mer, close to Marseille 
 TAL (Trans Alpine Pipeline) from Trieste 
 Druzhba from Danzig and Adamowo (BLR) 
 RRP from Rotterdam 
 
TAL is a joint venture of several oil companies23 supplying southern refineries: 
Burghausen, Ingolstadt and Karlsruhe. It has a capacity of up to 42 m tons per year. 
SPSE (Société du Pipeline Sud-Européen) supplies Karlsruhe in the south-west; this 
is also a joint venture of several majors (TOTAL, BP, Shell and others). The share-
holder structure in detail is listed in the “Fundamental Terms” section at the begin-
ning.  
Druzhba (“Friendship”) starting in Samara, north of the Caspian Sea, splits in Belarus 
into two branches: The northern one passes Belarus, crosses Poland and ends in 
Germany, while the southern one takes a route through Ukraine supplying the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and the Balkan states. The operator of the pipeline is the state-
owned Russian company Transneft, the world’s largest pipeline system operator. The 
refineries in Spergau and Schwedt, both in eastern Germany receive their feedstock 
though this way. 
RRP (N.V. Rotterdam-Rijn Pijpleiding Maatchappij) has the following shareholder 
structure: Shell Petroleum N.V. 40%, Ruhr Oel GmbH24 20%, BP 20%, Shell 
Deutschland Oil GmbH 10%, Texaco Nederland B.V. 10%. The pipeline supplies the 
west of Germany – the refineries in Cologne. 
NWO Nord-West-Oelleitung GmbH NDO  
The 391-km long pipeline transports crude oil from the harbour of Wilhelmshaven to 
Cologne-Wesseling and ensures the supply of oil to 4 refineries. 
Shareholders are Ruhr Oel GmbH 33.69%, BP 25.64%, Shell 20.40% and the Hol-
born Europa Refinery, which belongs to Tamoil, with 20.27%. The NWO operator is 
also in charge of the NDO Norddeutsche Oelleitung that runs from Wilhelmshaven to 
Hamburg. Wilhelmshaven is supposed to be the deepest German industrial harbour. 
Most of the crude oil imported to Germany gets into the country in Wilhelmshaven: 
About 32 m tons per year compared to only 4.4 m tons from Hamburg. 
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 OMV 25%, SHELL 24%, ExxonMobil 16%, RuhrOel 11%, ENI 10%, BP 9%, ConocoPhillips 3%, 
Total 2% 
24
 Joint venture of BP and PDVSA, a Venezuelan oil company 
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Norddeutsche Oelleitungsges. mbH 
A wholly owned subsidiary of the Holborn Europa Refinery, thus the refinery owned 
by Tamoil is fully supplied from Wilhelmshaven. 
MVL 
MVL acts on behalf of the chemical industry and takes part in supplying the refineries 
in Spergau (Mitteldeutschland Refinery of TOTAL, holding 55%) and Schwedt (PCK 
Refinery holds 45%) with feedstock from the Druzhba pipeline. 
MERO 
The operator of the MERO pipeline is a German subsidiary of its Czech mother, a 
company wholly owned by the Czech Republic’s treasury department. It branches of 
the TAL in Bavaria and supplies the main tank farm in Nelahozeves near Prague. 
Product pipelines 
RRP 
The crude oil pipeline from Rotterdam consists of pipes that are used for pumping 
products into Germany and importing them in the most efficient way. It feeds into the 
RMR pipeline when crossing the German border. 
RRB 
Rohrleitung Rostock-Böhlen supplies a variety of oil products from Spergau to 
Rostock. 
CEPS  
Its full name is “Central European Pipeline System“ and is owned by NATO. Its origi-
nal purpose was to ensure the supply of NATO troops with turbine fuel, petrol and 
diesel. Furthermore, it supplies German airports through providing a direct connec-
tion between for example Frankfurt airport and the BP refinery in Lingen. Moreover, it 
connects Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. It is operated – 
at least throughout Germany – by FBG Fernleitungsgesellschaft mbH, which appear-
sto be under control of the Federal State. 
NEPS 
The above-mentioned FBG also manages the North European Pipeline System 
which connects Germany and Denmark. It has the same objectives to meet as 
CEPS; both are also supposed to connect several NATO tank farms to guard re-
serves for military purposes. 
RMR Rhein-Main-Rohrleistungstransportgesellschaft mbH 
This connects Ingolstadt, Frankfurt and Cologne, supplying them with products from 
Pernis, Rotterdam. The RMR pipeline starts at the German border to the Nether-
lands. It can be considered the German stage of the RRP pipeline from Rotterdam. 
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MIPRO 
Mitteldeutsche Produktenleitung Leuna-Hartmannsdorf, works on behalf of the Refin-
ery Mitteldeutschland of TOTAL. Hartmannsdorf is a location of tank farms for prod-
ucts. 
PCK 
Has its origin at the PCK refinery in Schwedt and takes its route to Seefeld with an 
annual capacity amounting to 3.8 m tons. 
Furthermore there are product pipelines like the Ruhr Oel pipeline from Gelsen-
kirchen to Duisburg, a Shell pipeline from the refinery in Heide back to Brunsbüttel, 
the origin of the oil it processes. OMV operates product pipes from Burghausen to 
Munich via Feldkirchen. 
5.2.3. Storage Deposits 
Each refinery is supposed to have storage facilities either for crude oil or for proc-
essed oil. When combined with tank farms in pipeline terminals, they achieve a ca-
pacity of 24 m m³ or approximately 17 m tons or 17% of demand in 2007. It can be 
assumed that the latter tank farms are shared by their owners among the share-
holder structure of the pipeline operator or the refining site. The storage deposit in 
Wilhelmshaven alone can capture 1.6 Mio m³ of liquids. 
TABLE 12: GERMANY, STORAGE DEPOSITS25 
Storage deposits exceeding 1000 m³ in 1000 m3 
External tank farms
1)
 by federal states 2006 
Schleswig-Holstein  1702.4 
  - share stored in caverns 1582.2 
Hamburg 2196.4 
Niedersachsen 22392.5 
  - share stored in caverns 21442.4 
Bremen 1911.3 
  - thereof caverns 1213.4 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 6562.5 
  - share stored in caverns 3161.2 
Hessen  1091.9 
Rheinland-Pfalz 1749.1 
Baden-Württemberg 1409.6 
Bayern 1566.4 
Saarland 4.0 
Total-Berlin 1044.8 
Mecklenburg - Vorpommern 1258.9 
Brandenburg 364.5 
Sachsen-Anhalt 68.6 
Sachsen 514.5 
Thüringen 576.7 
Total storage capacity in external tank farms 44414.1 
in refineries and terminals 2) 24031.2 
Total 68445.3 
1)
Tank farms outside of refineries and processing sites 
 
FIGURE 8: GERMANY, STORAGE DE-
POSITS
26 
                                            
 
25 Table from MWV “Jahresbericht Mineralöl-Zahlen 2007” p. 36 
26 Figure from MEW (Mittelständische Mineralöl- und Energiewirtschaft Deutschland e. V.) “Jahresbericht 2007” p.77 
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Looking at TABLE 12 and FIGURE 8, it is easy to see that Lower Saxony has the larg-
est number of storage facilities for oil and oil products. Altogether, Germany has fa-
cilities that can store more than half of the country’s annual consumption. Crude oil 
mostly gets stored in caverns (large natural or man-made excavations beneath the 
surface), while products are usually stored in tanks above the surface – they have to 
be easily accessible. The deposits are generally supplied by river boats or tank wag-
ons and in some cases through pipelines directly from refining sites. EBV, a public 
entity, has every oil company operating in Germany as a member. It manages tank 
farms all over Germany, accounts for about 21 m tons of oil and oil products stored 
and monitors the minimum reserve system as defined by law. The minimum reserve 
has to cover 90 days of German consumption; in actual fact the reserves exceed this 
value by far. 
Independent tank farm operators that sell the rights to use their infrastructure play an 
important role when it comes to securing supply and storing reserves of the country, 
accounting for about 10 m m³ of storage facilities throughout the country. These pro-
viders are organised in the “Unabhängiger Tanklagerverband e.V.”. There are further 
numerous smaller tank farms of medium-sized firms trading with oil products. 
5.2.4. Conclusions for Germany 
Germany experienced a lot of structural turmoil in the refining industry – history. The 
German refining market has been hit by several demand shocks after the Second 
World War. Exploding demand – demand in 1950 was eight times what was available 
until 1960 – made fast expansion necessary. This policy in turn led to deteriorating 
capacity utilization rates and capacities had to be cut down again. German reunifica-
tion in 1990 again caused reorganization of the sector. Until 1993, even the transport 
business was highly regulated with licensing and allocation of transport rights and 
regulation of prices. Nowadays Germany’s refining industry is a quite modern sector, 
still subject to strict regulation but primarily with regards to environmental issues. 10 
firms are engaged in running refineries. 
There are close ties with the Netherlands, from where significant amounts of crude oil 
and products ready for consumption are imported. Germany exports substantial 
amounts of products, in particular relative to the sizes of the target countries, to Aus-
tria and the Czech Republic. Despite Benelux states, France and Great Britain do not 
lie in the focus of this work, one can not ignore Germany’s active business operations 
with these countries. 
The market is dominated by large international and vertically integrated companies 
able to exploit economies of scale and scope. This constitutes an obstacle to enter 
the market. Buyer power can be assumed to be bigger with large, internationally act-
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ing companies, most notably when it comes to purchasing crude oil on the interna-
tional markets. Royal Dutch Shell is the leader in the refining sector, accounting for 
30% of German production of refined products. Should any concerns arise about 
concentration, they may be related to the fact that Shell runs a refinery with a capac-
ity of 21 m tons per year in Pernis, Rotterdam and sells significant amounts on the 
German market. 
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5.3. Italy 
 
 
FIGURE 9: ITALY 
 
Italy consumed 83.8 m tons of crude oil in 2007, the last decline of more than 3% is 
partly due to the fact that less oil was used to generate electricity. The usage of oil 
has been intensified as a consequence of a shortage of natural gas. 
Crude oil imports in 2007 totalled 88.2 m tons. The number one crude oil supplier 
was Libya (25.8m tons). It was followed by Russia (16.5m tons) Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia and Azerbaijan. 
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5.3.1. Refining 
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FIGURE 10: ITALIAN IMPORTS, ABSOLUTE AND CHANGES 
 
It is easy to see in FIGURE 10 above that Italian refinery capacity exceeds domestic 
consumption. Furthermore, the two variables had shown opposite tendencies: While 
consumption is set to decline slowly capacity was still being extended until 2007. In 
any case, it is quite likely that a ceiling has been reached, given the international evo-
lution of the refining industry and environmental regulation. Anyhow, it should be 
noted that in the 1970s, Italy had twice the number of refineries and almost double 
the capacity – parameters which had to be changed in order to meet the changes in 
demand patterns. 
Data from BP and EIA 
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FIGURE 11: ITALIAN CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY 
 
Looking at the Italian refining market, one has to bear in mind that it was subject to 
price regulation by the federal state until 1994, at which time the market was fully lib-
eralised. 
As it is shown in FIGURE 11 ABOVE, Italy is in a comfortable position regarding the 
supply of refined products: The country can easily meet its domestic demand and 
export what is left; it is not dependent on large-scale imports. As we will see from TA-
BLE 13 below, Italy mostly imports feedstock for its chemical industry and some light 
fuel oil. 
According to the Unione Petrolifera27, there are 16 refining sites in Italy, with an at-
mospheric distillation capacity of approximately 120 m tons per year. Two refineries 
with nameplate capacities between 6 and 11 m tons have been closed since 2006 
and one large refinery with a capacity of more than 13 m tons has been commis-
sioned. This fact follows the trend to a smaller number of refineries with greater pro-
duction capabilities, something which points to considerable economies of scale. 
In contrast to the countries dealt with before, Italy’s refining industry is expanding in 
capacity, albeit shrinking in terms of the number of sites. Together with declining do-
mestic consumption, an increasing amount of refined products are being exported. 
The country’s good position in the Mediterranean Sea with many harbours and an 
                                            
 
27
 The association of the Italian oil industry. 
Data from BP and EIA 
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extensive coastline goes hand in hand with great accessibility for tankers from major 
North African crude oil exporters, tankers from the Arabian Peninsula or from the 
Black Sea. 
In 2007 and 2008, the ISAB refineries, a joint venture of ERG and the Russian Lukoil 
was started up. The refinery offers substantial conversion capacity and concentrates 
on producing middle distillates while at the same time being flexible in crude oil feed-
stock. 
The construction of the ISAB refineries easily be inferred as being a part of a policy 
towards exporting refined products as the refineries obviously are not only designed 
to meet local demand. 
Below the 16 (ISAB consists of two sites) refining sites are listed in TABLE 13 with 
ownership structure, capacities and provisional market shares. 
Company Refining sites 
Nameplate 
capacity 
Share in 
equity Location 
Distillation 
capacity 
Total Market 
share 
    in m tons in %   in m tons   in % 
Agip/ENI Sannazzaro 8.50 100.00% Sannazzaro 8.50    
  Venice 4.20 100.00% Venice 4.20    
  Livorno 4.30 100.00% Livorno 4.30    
  Taranto 5.50 100.00% Taranto 5.50    
  Milazzo Refinery 9.80 50.00% Milazzo 4.90    
  Gela  5.00 100.00% Gela 5.00 32.40 30.48% 
          
Esso/ExxonMobil Augusta  8.80 100.00% Augusta 8.80    
  Sarpom Refinery 8.75 75.40% Trecate 6.60 15.40 14.48% 
          
Tamoil Cremona 4.50 100.00% Cremona 4.50 4.50 4.23% 
          
TOTAL Rome Refinery 4.30 71.90% Pantano 3.09 3.09 2.91% 
          
ERG Petroli Rome Refinery 4.30 28.10% Pantano 1.21    
  Sarpom Refinery 8.75 24.60% Trecate 2.15    
ERG MED* ISAB Refineries 19.40 51.00% Syracuse 9.89 13.25 12.47% 
          
MOL Mantova 2.60 100.00% Mantova 2.60 2.60 2.45% 
          
Saras SpA Saras Refinery 15.00 100.00% Sarroch 15.00 15.00 14.11% 
          
Iplom Iplom Refinery 1.75 100.00% Busalla 1.75 1.75 1.65% 
          
KNPC** Milazzo Refinery 9.80 50.00% Milazzo 4.90 4.90 4.61% 
          
APIOIL Api Refinery 3.90 100.00% Ancona 3.90 3.90 3.67% 
          
Lukoil ISAB Refineries 19.40 49.00% Syracuse 9.51 9.51 8.94% 
TOTAL     106.30 106.30 100.00% 
  *100% subsidiary of ERG      
  **Kuwait National Petroleum Co.      
Source: Unione Petrolifera              
52 
TABLE 13: ITALIAN REFINERIES 
What is astonishing about the ownership structure of Italian refining sites is that a 
number of them belong to rather small companies or can be considered as being pri-
vately run. Saras, Iplom and API are small entrepreneurial entities accounting in total 
for about 20% of the country’s refining capacity. Saras SpA, controlled by the Moratti 
family, alone accounts for almost 15%. The picture drawn by the Italian industry pro-
vides evidence that also small entities can prevail in an industry subject to significant 
economies of scale 
Besides, the industry structure resembles somewhat the German picture. One firm, 
ENI is leading the way, with a 30% share of Italian refining capacity. ENI is followed 
by ExxonMobil, ERG and Saras SpA, all holding market shares between 10 and 
15%. At last there are several smaller players beneath the 10% mark. 
The reader has to bear in mind, that the geographic definition of the market will pre-
sumably not include all refineries in the south of Italy given that they may not be part 
of the defined geographic market. The country lacks suitable means of mass trans-
portation of oil products from the south to the north. 
However for reasons of clearness and completeness, all refining sites are cited in the 
table above. On the other hand, ENI holds interests in several German and Czech 
refineries, so matters will not become clear before market shares for the defined 
geographic have been calculated. This will be the next step after having analysed 
each country separately. FIGURE 12 describes the output structure of Italy’s refineries 
 
Output of the Italian refineries 
LPG
Petrol
Diesel
Light Fuel Oil
Heavy Fuel Oil
Turbine fuel
Naphtha
Lubricants
Semi-finished products
Bitumen
Other
 
FIGURE 12: OUTPUT STRUCTURE OF ITALY’S REFINERIES 
  % of output 
LPG 2.10% 
Petrol 19.10% 
Diesel 37.50% 
Light Fuel Oil 4.20% 
Heavy Fuel 
Oil 7.60% 
Turbine fuel 3.90% 
Naphtha 4.07% 
Lubricants 1.20% 
Semi-
finished 
products 5.00% 
Bitumen 3.60% 
Other 1.80% 
Refinery 
consumption 10.10% 
  100.00% 
TABLE 14: OUTPUT STRUC-
TURE OF ITALY’S REFINER-
IES  
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The reader can easily spot the emphasis that lies on the production of motor fuels. 
Year after year, ever more diesel-driven cars are bought, while at the same time the 
number of cars using petrol is slowly declining. This trend dictates that additional ca-
pacity is created to achieve higher yields for middle distillates. 
 
Domestic production vs. Imports 2007 
  Domestic production Imports* Total 
  in t in % in t* in % in t 
Liquefied Petrol Gas       2,255,000    60.3%     1,483,000    39.7%       3,738,000    
Gasoline           
Petrol     20,101,000    98.7%        258,000    1.3%     20,359,000    
Naphtha       4,072,000    64.4%     2,249,000    35.6%       6,321,000    
Middle distillates           
Turbine fuel       4,135,000    83.7%        807,000    16.3%       4,942,000    
Diesel      39,561,000    96.7%     1,332,000    3.3%     40,893,000    
Fuel oil light       4,388,000    72.1%     1,695,000    27.9%       6,083,000    
Fuel oil heavy       8,079,000    92.8%        626,000    7.2%       8705,000    
Other           
Refinery cons. & losses     10,648,000            
Semi-finished products       5,255,000    41.0%     7,560,000    59.0%     12,815,000    
Lubricants       1,252,000    83.7%        243,000    16.3%       1,495,000    
Bitumen       3,773,000    99.9%           5,000    0.1%       3,778,000    
Various       1,865,000    29.4%     4,469,000    70.6%       6334,000    
TOTAL 2007   105,384,000    83.6%   20,727,000    16.4%   126,.111,000    
TOTAL 2006     104,388,000 83.2%     21,023,000    16.8%     125,411,000    
Source: Unione Petrolifera *Figures for imports are declared being provisional   
TABLE 15: ITALIAN DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 2007 
 
Both for petrol and for diesel fuel no significant import shares are evident. The coun-
try is dependent on imports of naphtha and semi-finished products that represent 
important feedstock for the chemical industry. The picture drawn by the figures in TA-
BLE 15 above does not come by surprise, as we have seen at the beginning of the 
chapter that Italy has a surplus of refining capacity in respect of demand. 
Exports 
Italy exports considerable amounts of petrol, diesel and fuel oil. TABLE 16 gives the 
main recipients of petrol in Europe are Belgium and Spain claiming 38.9% of Italian 
exports to Europe. But there are also almost 2 m tons of petrol that get exported to 
the USA, this may be an indication of what in fact is economically sensible. Shipment 
costs obviously do not play a major role.  
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Italy's exports to Europe 
in thousand tons 
Countries Petrol Diesel Fuel Oil Total % of exports 
Austria              101                463            564 3.9% 
Belgium              655                441              671       1,767 12.1% 
France                36                613                15          664 4.5% 
Germany                -      0.0% 
Greece              210                498              118          826 5.6% 
Malta                36                164              787          987 6.7% 
Portugal                -      0.0% 
Great Britain                51                 11                62          124 0.8% 
Romania                  91              91 0.6% 
Spain              575             4,954              165       5,694 38.9% 
Switzerland              371                406                 9          786 5.4% 
Turkey                44                 58                44          146 1.0% 
Former Yugoslavia              426             1,261                84       1,771 12.1% 
Others              305                436              481       1,222 8.3% 
Total            2,810             9,396           2,436      14,642 100.0% 
TABLE 16: ITALY’S EXPORTS TO EUROPE 
 
About 10 m tons of diesel leave the country each year, destined for Spain, account-
ing for more than half of the total export volume, former Yugoslavia, France, Greece, 
Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. 
Imports 
Imports of finished products declined as imports of semi-finished products increased. 
Italy’s imports of finished products mostly concern chemical feedstock and LPG. The 
main countries of origin have been the USA (~21%), Libya (~20%) and the CIS coun-
tries with about 8% of total imports. The most important exporter of refined products 
in Europe is France (~7%). Looking at the defined geographic area, only Germany 
and Switzerland are listed, together coming up to a paltry 1%. 
Similar to Germany, LIFO and LOFI values, given in TABLE 17 below, are quite high, 
though they have declined compared to 2006. This is not surprising; Italy has some 
excess production that is exported. At the same time, only insignificant amounts have 
to be imported to fill the gaps in the Italian output structure. 
 
LIFO     
  2007 2006 
  0.84 0.89 
LOFI    
  2007 2006 
  0.70 0.74 
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TABLE 17: ITALY, LIFO&LOFI VALUES 
 
5.3.2. Transport 
The distribution of crude oil and products follows the pattern with which we have al-
ready been confronted. Refineries are supplied via pipelines in case that they are not 
located on the coast, where they are directly supplied by crude oil tankers. Refined 
products are transported in bulk loads to storage deposits, ideally through a product 
pipeline, from where they are distributed by means of transport that carry smaller 
loads but have a denser operating network, i.e. transport by tank wagon or lorry. The 
Italian Oil Industry Association puts the percentage rate of road haulage at 65% for 
consumer supplies. 
Not until 1998 was regulation of supply withdrawn or reformed, with public authorities 
aiming to reduce the vast number of sales points. 
As mentioned before, crude oil imported to Europe is almost always shipped to 
Europe by tanker. Italy’s position in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, favours this 
kind of transport, as almost a third of worldwide shipping routes traverse the Mediter-
ranean. In TABLE 18 the most important oil harbours are listed. 
Crude arrivals by ports 200728 
 
Location in tons 
Augusta (Syracuse) 14 650 000 
Cagliari 14 645 000 
Falconara (Ancona) 3 525 000 
Fiumicino (Rome) 3 645 000 
Gela (Caltanissetta) 2 480 000 
Genoa-Multedo* 15 020 000 
Livorno 4 665 000 
Milazzo (Messina) 7 590 000 
Priolo Melilli (Syracuse) 8 345 000 
Ravenna 140 000 
Savona- Vado Ligure 7 460 000 
Taranto 2 225 000 
Trieste** 33 590 000 
Venice - Porto Marghera 6 370 000 
Total 124 350 000 
*once provided crude for the CEL pipeline, which has been out of service since 1997 
** provides oil for the TAL pipeline 
TABLE 18: ITALY, CRUDE OIL ARRIVALS BY PORTS 
 
 
 
                                            
 
28
 Table from Unione Petrolifera “Annual Report 2008” p. 110 
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Pipelines 
 
Crude oil pipelines 
Not surprisingly, crude oil pipeline systems in Italy are designed to supply refineries 
in the hinterland of coastal regions, the accommodative pipelines are owned by the 
same owners of the refineries they supply. 
There are only two international crude oil pipelines: The TAL that starts in Trieste and 
crosses the Alps and the former CEL pipeline starting in Genoa. The TAL is operated 
by SIOT (Società Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino) from the harbour in Trieste to 
the Austrian border. FIGURE 9 at the beginning of the chapter on Italy shows locations 
of pipelines and refineries.  
PRAOIL is a pipeline operating company and wholly owned by ENI. With this knowl-
edge, one could argue that ENI is also the leader pipeline transportation. Through 
PRAOIL, it supplies the Sarpom refinery of ExxonMobil/ERG with feedstock. 
ARCOLA PETROLIFERA is a wholesaler, owned by the Moratti family, which also 
owns the SARAS SpA refinery on Sardinia. TABLE 19 gives the details29: 
 
Pipelines for crude oil 
Length 
in km Owner 
Genova-Ferrera (PV)                                   90 PRAOIL 
Ferrera (PV) - G.S. Bernardo 
(1)
                      206 PRAOIL 
Ferrera (PV) - Cassina de’ Pecchi                     68 PRAOIL 
Ferrera (PV) - Cremona                                113 PRAOIL 
Trecate (NO) - Ferrera (PV)                          43 ENI 
Genova - Busalla (GE) 24 IPLOM 
Quiliano (SV) - Trecate (NO)                         145 SARPOM 
La Spezia - Arcola (SP)                                                9 ARCOLA PETROLIFERA 
P. Marghera (VE) - Mantova                            123 IES 
Trieste - Timau (UD) (2)                              145 SIOT 
Fiumicino (RM) - Pantano di Grano (RM)             14 TOTAL 
Viggiano (PZ) - Taranto                           137 ENI 
Ragusa - Augusta (SR) 57 ENI 
Pipelines for products    
Ferrera - Carrosio (AL) - Arquata (AL)               62 PRAOIL 
Cassina de’ Pecchi (Ml) - Sant’Agata (Ml)            3 PRAOIL 
Sannazzaro (PV) - Rho (Ml)                         51 PRAOIL 
Sannazzaro (PV) - Chivasso (TO) - Volpiano (TO)      93 PRAOIL 
                                            
 
29
 Source: Unione Petrolifera 
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Sannazzaro (PV) - Fiorenzuola (PC)                  94 PRAOIL 
Genova - Lacchiarella (Ml) - Villasanta (Ml)        151 SIGEMI 
Lacchiarella (Ml) - Tavazzano (Ml)                 25 SIGEMI 
Lacchiarella (Ml) - Cassina de’ Pecchi (Ml)          10 SIGEMI 
Trecate (NO) - Vado Ligure (SV)                     158 SARPOM 
Trecate (NO) - Chivasso (TO)                       84 ESSO 
Trecate (NO) - Arluno (Ml)                           16 ESSO 
Trecate (NO) - Turbigo (Ml)                         13 ESSO 
Trecate (NO) - Malpensa (VA)                       33 SARPOM 
Busalla (GE) - Genova 24 IPLOM 
Arcola (SP) - La Spezia   9 ARCOLA PETROLIFERA 
Genova - Arquata Scrivia (AL)                         37 SIGEMI 
Cremona - Piacenza 29 EDIPOWER 
Cremona - Tavazzano (Ml) 54 TAMOIL 
Tavazzano (Ml) - Trecate (NO)                        62 TAMOIL 
Cremona - Borgo S.Giovanni (MN)           100 TAMOIL 
Borgo S.Giovanni (MN) - Dep. Sermide (MN)           11 ENDESA 
Dep. Sermide (MN) - Dep. Ostiglia (MN)           1 ENDESA 
Llvorno – Firenze 89 PRAOIL 
Civitavecchia (RM) - Fiumicino (RM)                   80 PRAOIL 
Pantano (RM) - Fiumicino (RM) 16 RAFFINERIA DI ROMA 
Ravenna - Porto Tolle (RO)                            92 ENEL 
Gaeta (LT) - Pomezia (RM)                   112 PRAOIL 
Trieste - Visco (UD) 62 SILONE 
(1)
 Italian section of the connection Ferrera - Aigle of CEL; (2) Italian section of the TAL, from Trieste - 
Ingolstadt. 
TABLE 19: ITALY, PIPELINES  
 
Product pipelines 
The above list provides an overview of the dense network of product pipelines, which 
expands across Italy. Although none of them can be considered as a north-south 
backbone of the country. The network primarily connects storage deposits with refin-
eries located either in the interior of the country or on the coast. 
SIGEMI is the abbreviation for “Sistema Integrato Genova”, with ENI holding a stake. 
Sigemi can be considered as being a subsidiary, at least partly, ENI entrusts with 
transport issues. The company also holds storage deposits in North Italy. 
EDIPOWER is an Italian power generation company. The in-house product pipeline 
supplies its power plant in Piacenza. 
ENDESA is a Spanish power generation firm, whose Italian activities have been 
merged wit EON Italy, so it can be assumed that the pipeline has changed ownership 
and now belongs to the latter company. 
ENEL is a major Italian power company owning the product pipeline form Ravenna to 
Porto Tolle. 
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SILONE – the pipeline from Trieste to Visco was once owned by TOTAL; current use 
or information about its owner could not be found. 
Not only the main industrial areas have had to be supplied with products. Unione 
Petrolifera estimated the total fuel distribution network to have 22,450 sales points at 
the end of 2006. The average throughput amounted to 1,618 m³ of fuels, which is 
among the lowest average throughputs in Europe. In most countries, it exceeds the 
2,000m³ mark, and surpassing even 3,000m3 in Germany, France and Great Britain. 
5.3.3. Storage Deposits 
In TABLE 20 below all deposits, in refineries or next to thermal power plants, exceed-
ing a capacity of 3,000m³ are cited30. 
Italy - Deposits for crude oil and products 
  
# of de-
posits 
Capacity 
(1)
 in thousand m³ 
Crude LGP Petrol Diesel 
Fuel 
Oil Lubricants Other Total 
Piemonte  72 – 21.5 536.1 1,471.8 671.0 108.8 68.4 2,877.6 
Val d’Aosta 2 – 0.1 0.3 2.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 3.9 
Liguria  34 1,814.9 7.0 240.5 637.0 1,024.8 165.1 226.8 4,116.1 
Lombardia 121 – 43.3 193.0 928.8 2,030.7 31.2 171.3 3,398.3 
Trentino Alto Adige 16 – 2.2 1.7 10.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 15.3 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 20 1,870.0 2.1 199.5 386.6 577.4 3.2 2.5 3,041.3 
Veneto 52 91.6 19.4 138.2 919.4 1,371.3 7.0 119.5 2,666.4 
Emilia Romagna 41 – 10.4 97.2 143.4 828.2 29.0 57.4 1,165.6 
Toscana 51 – 65.2 48.3 273.0 512.7 56.1 40.3 995.6 
Umbria 11 – 1.8 – 34.3 49.9 0.1 0.1 86.2 
Marche               16 – 5.4 4.0 79.5 48.2 1.1 20.1 158.3 
Lazio 47 – 6.1 590.4 1,155.1 351.4 29,6 460.0 2,592.6 
Abruzzo 18 – 4.8 30.8 75.1 18.8 1.1 31.8 162.4 
Molise 4 – 0.6 – 17.9 – – – 18.5 
Campania 59 – 36.0 642.6 707.8 300.8 23.2 123.6 1,834.0 
Puglia 44 – 30.4 21,8 41,6 625,8 5,5 0,5 725,6 
Basilicata 6 – 0.6 – 0.1 63.1 0.2 – 64 
Calabria               23 – 4.5 45.1 24.8 427.6 2.5 5.0 509.5 
Sardegna             39 – 11.2 22.0 49.6 249.0 7.2 67.4 406.4 
Sicilia 
(2)
          28 – 7.8 60.0 112.1 845.2 3.6 14.8 1.043.5 
TOTAL 704 3,776.5 280,4 2,871.5 7,070.7 9,996.4 474.8 1,410.8 25,881.1 
(1)
 Capacity includes all the deposits appending to the deposits of the central thermic power plants of Enel, as well as the ca-
pacities held by refineries. Deposits with a capacity beneath 3,000m³ excluded. 
(2)
 Incomplete data 
TABLE 20: ITALY, STORAGE DEPOSITS 
 
                                            
 
30
 Source: Unione Petrolifera/Ministero delle Attività Produttive 
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There are more than 700 deposits exceeding 3,000m³ and a further 15,000 tank 
farms with lower storage capability. The logic for the choice of location for refineries 
also applies to storage deposits: They are either located along the sea shore, where 
they can get delivered by tanker or they are positioned in the hinterland, in proximity 
to refineries, large industrial complexes or power plants. Capacities are concentrated 
in Liguria, Lombardia, Friuli, Piemonte, Veneto and Lazio. Most Italian crude oil re-
serves are stored in Friuli and Liguria. Generally, a North-South divide can be ob-
served, except for Sicily where significant refining capacities exist. 
ENI describes itself as “leader in storage and transport of petroleum products in It-
aly”31 in its annual report, but this is no surprise. ENI possesses the largest refining 
capacities, is the largest owner/operator in pipeline transport and therefore has to 
have the most comprehensive storage facilities. 
5.3.4. Conclusions for Italy 
At first sight, I found the scale of the oil industry striking, and that it even showed a 
slight increase in capacity in recent years. Imports of oil products amounted to 15 m 
tons in 2007. This value constitutes less than 20% of total domestic consumption – 
Italy can be considered as a relatively independent country, at least regarding supply 
with refined products. However it is – like almost every country in Europe – highly 
dependent on crude oil imports, as domestic production only reached 5.9 m tons 
compared to oil consumption of 83 m in 2007. 
The favourable geographical position in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea in close 
proximity to much-frequented shipping routes and not far away from important North 
African oil-exporting countries such as Libya, the comparative advantage of Italy’s oil 
refining sector is obvious. The centres are situated in Sicily; it is best supplied by 
crude oil tankers and in the northwest, where there is a high demand. 
In the 1970, Italy had twice as much refining capacity and suffered from capacity 
utilization ratios below 60% throughout the Eighties, making it necessary to scale 
back operations. Today the industry claims to operate at almost full capacity. Re-
forms were initiated and political efforts to liberalize the sector began in earnest. Over 
the past few years, existing sites have undergone a series of modernisation drives, 
involving upgrading conversion capacities and desulphurisation units in order to meet 
European standards and demand. In keeping with the European trend, Italian de-
mand is shifting to diesel fuel and light fuel oil, away from higher sulphuric fuels and 
petrol. According to the Italian Oil Industry Association, € 5.9 bn was invested in the 
modernisation of refineries to improve quality and lower emissions between 2001 and 
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2005. Further efforts were also made to enhance the complexity and efficiency of the 
remaining units. The introduction of the ISAB refineries should reduce the extent to 
which crude oil is shipped into the Adriatic and Ligurian Sea, to lower the burden for 
the environment and traffic. 
The leading firm in the industry is without a doubt ENI S.p.A., a highly vertically inte-
grated company, with a domestic market share of 30% and a strong position in the 
areas of storing and transport. Italy has been rife with allegations about horizontal 
collusion in retailing motor fuels and several measures have been implemented to 
counter these. Licences for gas stations along motorways were reallocated, better 
comparativeness of fuel prices for drivers and licences for large supermarkets to sell 
fuel were issued. However, entry into the refining market is another story. 
 
5.4. Hungary 
 
FIGURE 13: HUNGARY 
 
Data from BP and EIA 
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FIGURE 14: HUNGARIAN OIL CONSUMPTION 
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FIGURE 15: HUNGARIAN CONSUMPTION AND 
CAPACITY 
As it can be seen in FIGURE 14, Hungarian oil consumption peaked at the end of the 
Sixties when car traffic levels soared and agriculture was being modernized. In FIG-
URE 15 the infrastructure of the Hungarian oil industry is depicted. Again product 
pipelines are depicted in green and crude oil pipelines in red respectively. 
The amount of 7.6 m tons of mineral oil was consumed in 2007; the majority of oil, 
about 5 m tons was used by the transport sector. Refining capacity exceeded domes-
tic consumption, as can be seen in the bar chart above. There is a considerable 
amount of capacity in the areas of refining and transportation (setup of pipelines), 
seeing as there was a huge wave of expansion in the late 1960s. When it became 
clear that existing capacity was underexploited and capacity utilization ratios were 
deteriorating, capacity was slashed to enhance efficiency. The development can be 
followed in FIGURE 15. Since the beginning of 2002, and the decommissioning of the 
Tisza and Zala refineries, there is only one crude oil processing site in Hungary lo-
cated on the premises of the Duna Refinery in Százhalombatta. It is owned and op-
erated by MOL. 
In recent years, Hungary has been supplied with crude oil almost exclusively from 
Russia, as local resources are declining and annual production only covers 20% of 
demand. 
5.4.1. Refining 
Hungary had the ability to refine 8.1 m tons of crude oil in 2007 at its single refinery, 
TABLE 21 provides further details. 
Company Refining 
sites 
Nameplate 
capacity 
Share in 
Equity 
Location Distillation 
Capacity 
Total Market 
share in % 
    in m tons in %   in m tons   in % 
MOL Duna Refinery 8.10 100.00% Százhalombatta 8.10 8.10 100.00% 
TOTAL      8.10 100.00% 
Source: MOL "Annual Report 2007"       
TABLE 21: HUNGARIAN REFINERIES 
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As can easily be inferred from the above table, MOL operates the only oil refinery in 
Hungary. Moreover, according to the IEA MOL “controls approximately 80% of the 
Hungarian wholesale oil products market”.  
MOL exports a substantial amount of products – in 2004 exports amounted to 2.9 m 
oil equivalents. Petrol and diesel are the most actively traded products with the main 
export destinations being Austria, Germany and Slovakia. 
The lack of any recent data regarding foreign trade with respect to products and 
countries means that it is not possible to conduct a detailed analysis of import/export 
flows. However, I did some calculations to get estimates for the LIFO and LOFI val-
ues, which are given in TABLE 22. Taking 2007’s production and consumption figures 
and assuming exports of products still amounting to 3 m tons results in a LIFO of 
0.67 and a LOFI of 0.63. These estimates can be considered to be evidence that the 
relevant geographic market is bigger than Hungary. 
 
LIFO     
  2007   
  0.67   
LOFI    
  2007   
  0.63   
TABLE 22: HUNGARY, LIFO&LOFI VALUES 
 
5.4.2. Transport 
Almost half the total amount of crude oil and its products is transported by pipeline; 
quantities forwarded by rail and by barge are declining. Road transport comes in 
second with a 31% share of the total volume shipped. Delivery by tank lorry is crucial 
to supply the relatively thin filling station network of around 1000 stations country-
wide. MOL runs most of the stations (354 in 2005) followed by Shell and OMV with 
half the outlets. 
Crude oil pipelines 
The first crude oil pipeline in Hungary was a connection to the northern branch of 
Druzhba. The branch connection to Százhalombatta was established in 1965. To 
meet growing demand, Druzhba II was planned and finished in 1969. In the Seven-
ties, when Hungary’s demand for crude oil reached its peak, forecasts said that do-
mestic demand would reach 20 m tons in 2000. Another pipeline project was 
planned, the Adria pipeline, with an annual capacity of 10 m tons of crude oil.  
In fact, demand in 2000 accounted for 6.8 m tons, meaning that Hungary possesses 
significant surplus capacity in crude oil supplies by transport. The Adria pipeline is 
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used for transit purposes. It opens up the possibility to deliver INA’s Sisak refinery in 
Croatia with Russian crude. MOL holds 47.2% equity in INA. Since 1992 crude oil is 
almost exclusively supplied via the Druzhba pipeline. This connection and the Adria 
pipeline are still in use (the latter turned out to enhance MOL’s buyer power in bar-
gaining with Russia). 
Druzhba I&II  
Druzhba II is the southern branch of the main oil pipeline from Russia towards 
Europe. It is capable of transporting 7.9 m tons per year and was completed in 1979. 
Whether the connecting pipeline from Druzhba I is still in operation remains unclear; 
sometimes it is uncharted on pipeline maps. 
Adria 
The Adria crude oil pipeline starts in Omisalj in Croatia. Construction was completed 
in 1978 and it has a capacity of 10 m tons per year. 
Product pipelines 
The importance of transport by product pipelines is on the rise, whereas transport by 
rail is losing importance. Trains are used to supply processing sites or buyers of bulk 
loads that have no pipeline connection as well as for export deliveries. MOL holds 
more than 1000-km of pipeline that connect 7 of its 8 whole sale depots countrywide. 
Hungary’s domestic product pipeline network is the densest of all countries looked at 
up to now. 
5.4.3. Storage Deposits 
Százhalombatta and Fényeslitke (80,000m³ capacity near the Ukrainian border, fed 
by Druzhba II) are crude oil storage yards run by MOL’s logistics division. 41 storage 
deposits are owned or leased by MOL. There are 8 remaining storage depots owned 
by MOL in Hungary. All, except for one, are connected to product pipelines. 
Hungary holds emergency energy reserves amounting to 1.2 m tons. These reserves 
contain crude oil as well as products and should cover demand for 90 days of con-
sumption. The Hungarian Hydrocarbon Stockpiling Association – MSZKSZ – controls 
five storage companies running tank farms. A third of strategic reserves are stored in 
facilities belonging to MOL that is supposed to hold about 75% of capacity. The re-
maining quarter is accounted for by independent providers that rent their capacity out 
to customers. 
MOL is engaged in retailing mineral oil products in several countries in the mid-
eastern region. MOL runs a network of deposits to supply its sales points, with most 
of these deposits being supplied by pipeline or barge – like MOL’s deposit in 
Korneuburg, near Vienna, or the tank farms in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
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which can easily be supplied by product pipelines or by barge on the Danube. MOL’s 
ownership of Slovakia’s Slovnaft refinery is especially useful, because it provides ac-
cess to the product pipeline network connecting both countries. Furthermore plans to 
link the pipeline networks of MOL in Hungary and Slovnaft are “under review”, ac-
cording to a publication of the company. 
It is no surprise that the largest (and sole) producer of refined products is also domi-
nant in storing and transport. For a potential entrant, this environment may seem 
daunting, as entrance would entail at least tough bargaining with the incumbent. 
5.4.4. Conclusions for Hungary 
It is worth mentioning that MOL inherited industrial premises that could be regarded 
being obsolete and inefficient in many cases. Nevertheless the company remains the 
largest player in Hungary and does business across national borders. Estimates 
forecast the country to experience only a marginal growth in demand, further support-
ing MOL’s ambitions as capacity does not have to be fully exhausted to cover do-
mestic demand. 
Obviously, MOL holds a dominant position in Hungary – for refining, wholesaling and 
retailing. Not only does the company own the country’s only oil refining site but it also 
runs a dense network of product pipelines and storage deposits. In addition to this, a 
second important refinery is owned by MOL: The Slovakian Slovnaft Refinery in Bra-
tislava, including access to its product pipelines linking Slovakia and the Czech Re-
public. This asset is a decisive one to extend market power to the surrounding coun-
tries targeted by the MOL Group: Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Austria. 
The acquisition of the Croatian INA and the IES Refinery in Mantova, North Italy, 
gives MOL the opportunity to expand its commercial interests in Austria and even in 
Romania. This enlargement of capacity has the cumulative effect of strengthening 
the company’s position in Hungary, as it creates free capacity at home. 
Although international majors, as well as the Austrian OMV, are active in the Hungar-
ian fuel retailing market, there are parts of the country where only MOL is able to de-
liver certain products. This is due to the large distance to refineries not run by the 
Hungarian market leader. In 2005 MOL changed its pricing policy and increased its 
retail prices by less than its wholesale prices in order to force competitors to reduce 
their margins or to lose market share in retailing. The European Commission prohib-
ited MOL doing so to stop the company from further increasing its market share in 
wholesaling.32  
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 IEA, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, “Hungary 2006 Review”, Paris, 2006, p. 115 
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MOL’s course of action can be seen as an attempt to exert a price squeeze on its 
competitors. According to Motta, a vertically integrated firm engaging in a price 
squeeze is selling the input to the rival at a prohibitively high price. This procedure 
intends increase the rival firms cost of production. The entry of the British retail com-
pany Tesco into the Hungarian fuel retail market in 2004 underlines how controver-
sial this issue is. Tesco’s filling stations are not supplied by MOL’s refineries and put 
substantial pressure on prices in fuel retailing. Consumers showed great willingness 
to travel to benefit from price differences. These significant chain-of-substitution ef-
fects might have had immediate detrimental effects on competition if the price 
squeeze had prevailed.  
While market positions are clear within Hungary, it will be interesting to investigate 
the competitive environment on the market for refined products that is nevertheless 
not supposed to be a national one. 
 
 
5.5. Slovakia 
 
 
FIGURE 16: SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
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FIGURE 17: SLOVAKIA, OIL CONSUMPTION 
 
Looking at the chart in FIGURE 17, it is easy to identify a familiar pattern in oil con-
sumption over time, at least when comparing it to Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
Oil consumption reached its peak in the second half of the Seventies before starting 
a substantial decline. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil consumption stabi-
lized and ascended somewhat. It is astonishing that oil consumption was cut in half in 
the years between 1975 and 1995. Consumption of mineral oil amounted to 3.8 m 
tons in 2007. Though there are some indigenous sources of crude oil in the west of 
Slovakia, 5.6 m tons are imported from Russia through the Druzhba pipeline. The 
supplying firm is Lukoil which stepped in after the demise of Yukos. 
5.5.1. Refining 
The sole mineral oil refining site in Bratislava had 5.8 tons of refining capacity in 
2007. All refining capacity is concentrated in the Slovnaft refinery in Bratislava; de-
tails are shown in TABLE 23 below. 
 
Company Refining sites 
Nameplate 
capacity 
Share in 
Equity 
Location 
Distillation 
Capacity 
Total 
Market 
share  
  in m tons in %  in m tons  in % 
Slovnaft/MOL Slovnaft Refinery 5.80 100.00% Bratislava 5.80 5.80 100.00% 
TOTAL      5.80 100.00% 
Source: MOL "Annual Report 2007"       
TABLE 23: SLOVAKIAN REFINERIES 
 
Data from BP and EIA 
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Between 2000 and 2003, the Hungarian MOL gradually acquired Slovnaft, ending up 
with an equity share of 98.4%. Large investments have been made in order to mod-
ernise the premises of the refinery and enlarge its conversion capabilities. 
Output structure is depicted in the diagram below; to the right the exact figures are 
listed. Regrettably, no figures could be found for products such as turbine fuel, light 
fuel oils or lubricants. According to SAPPO33 Slovnaft has achieved the following 
output structure, explained in detail in FIGURE 18. 
Output structure of the Slovnaft Refinery
28%
49%
5%
7%
1%
10% Petrol
Diesel 
Fuel oil heavy
Petrochemical feedstock
Bitumen
Other
 
FIGURE 18: OUTPUT STRUCTURE OF THE 
 SLOVNAFT REFINERY 
 
 
Output in tons 
Petrol   1,617,000    
Diesel    2,864,000    
Fuel oil heavy      284,000    
Petrochemi-
cal feedstock      427,000    
Bitumen       36,000    
Other      588,000    
Total 5,816,000 
TABLE 24: OUTPUT 
STRUCTURE OF THE SLOV-
NAFT REFINERY 
 
 
 
87% of production refers to motor fuels and other light products, underlining that the 
Slovnaft refinery has reached a good position regarding conversion technology. Con-
version is about a refinery’s capability to convert crude oil to light products. Demand 
for the latter products is rising throughout Europe – this can be considered beneficial 
for Slovnaft’s export market ambitions. 
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FIGURE 19: SLOVAKIAN CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY 
 
The availability of excess production is visible in FIGURE 19 above, revealing that 
Slovnaft is in the comfortable position of being able to fully cover domestic demand 
and export the remainder, at least as far as the bare figures are concerned. 
The calculation of import shares compared to domestic production is not very de-
tailed given that the Slovakian Oil Industry and Trade Association only provides fig-
ures for the most common products. The Slovnaft refinery certainly produces a range 
of other products, but even more common ones such as turbine fuel are not listed in 
TABLE 2534. Slovnaft’s Annual Report says that 79,700 tons were produced in 2007 – 
the main part of demand for turbine fuel may have met with imports. 
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 Source: SAPPO "Annual Report 2007" only available at the association's homepage 
Data from BP and EIA 
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Domestic production vs. Imports 2007 
  Domestic production Imports Total 
  in t in % in t in % in t 
Gasoline          
Petrol       1,617,000    87.6%        229,000    12.4%       1,846,000    
Middle distillates          
Diesel        2,864,000    84.6%        520,000    15.4%       3,384,000    
Fuel oil heavy         284,000    100.0%   0.0%         284,000    
Other          
Petrochemical feedstock         427,000    100.0%   0.0%         427,000    
Bitumen           36,000    100.0%   0.0%           36,000    
Other         588,000    73.9%        208,000    26.1%         796,000    
TOTAL 2007       5,816,000    85.9%        957,000    14.1%       6,773,000    
TOTAL 2006          5,254,000 84.8%           940,000    15.2%          6,194,000    
TABLE 25: SLOVAKIAN DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 2007 
The Slovakian Oil Industry Association declares that “¾ of domestic products were 
exported from Slovakia”, a figure that does not really correlate with the figures listed 
above. If 75% of domestic production were exported, domestic consumption would 
not be covered by the remainder and imports of ~ 1 m tons of products, even if con-
sumption was overrated and amounted to less than 3 m tons per year. 
In addition to this, SAPPO writes that “60% of domestic demand for products was 
covered by domestic production”, so the total amount of imports should reach 2.3 m 
tons. When calculating with imports of 2.3 m tons, exporting 75% of production would 
be feasible. Regrettably, there exist no more detailed import figures than those given 
in TABLE 25 above. 
Calculating the LIFO/LOFI values, however, suggest that imports of 2.3 m tons seem 
to match reality given that the country’s oil sector seems to be quite open in both di-
rections. These values can only be calculated with figures for exports, production and 
consumption, which is really advantageous with dubious import amounts. 
 
LIFO     
  2007 2006 
  0.38 0.39 
LOFI    
  2007 2006 
  0.25 0.25 
TABLE 26: SLOVAKIA, LIFO&LOFI VALUES 
 
Without setting clear thresholds, both LIFO and LOFI given in TABLE 26 do suggest 
that the market for refined products is definitely larger than Slovakia. The LIFO value 
of 0.38 for 2007 fits the assumption of 40% imports which was discussed a few lines 
above. In 2005, IEA wrote that “The Slovakian oil refining industry exports 54% of its 
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refinery output (80% in value)”35. These figures are not as up to date as the figures of 
SAPPO are, however they warrant a recalculation of the LOFI values. With LIFO 
value coming up to 0.77 and the LOFI to 0.50, the changes are not negligible though 
the message remains the same. A country that exports half of its domestic production 
can not really be considered a market on its own. Either way, key target countries of 
Slovakian exports were the Czech Republic, Austria and Poland. These countries 
were primarily receiving motor fuels, thereof 1.2 m tons of petrol and 2 m tons diesel. 
There were additional exports of petrochemical feedstock to France, Italy and Ger-
many. 
Imports to the Slovak Republic originate from Austria, the Czech Republic and from 
Polish and Hungarian refineries. These imported products are largely motor fuels. 
Slovakia had to import 100% of its demand for LPG, and for the majority of its de-
mand for fuel oil and lubricants (~90%). In addition to this, about a third of required 
amounts of diesel, petrol and bitumen had to be brought into the country. 
5.5.2. Transport 
About 730 service stations were in operation throughout Slovakia in 2007, of which 
209 were run by Slovnaft, 92 by OMV, 66 by Shell, 63 by Jurki, 39 by Agip and some 
by Lukoil. As already outlined, filling stations have to be delivered by tank truck be-
cause the road system offers the densest transport system. 
The country is well-connected to neighbouring countries via the Adria pipeline with 
Hungary or with the Czech Republic with the Druzhba crude oil pipeline. Transpetrol, 
a. s., has been a joint venture of the Slovak government (51%) and Yukos Finance 
(49%), which operates from Amsterdam. The company runs the Slovak sections of 
the Druzhba and Adria pipelines. Slovnaft is the only customer of Transpetrol in Slo-
vakia, though Česká Rafinérská and Paramo a.s. also import crude oil via the two 
pipelines. In March 2009 the Slovakian government bought back Yukos’ share in eq-
uity and wholly owns the company at this point of time. This might be the essential 
step towards the construction of the Bratislava-Wien pipeline (BSP), the project has 
been delayed many times in the past due to the stake of the Russian trading com-
pany. Transpetrol is also engaged in storing oil and oil products. 
With regards to product pipelines, Slovakia has access to a product pipeline network 
with the Czech Republic. Furthermore, a product pipeline runs from the refinery in 
Bratislava to Stožok, located in the middle of the country. With its location near the 
Danube, the Slovakian Slovnaft Refinery can be said to be in a favourable position to 
export its products on a large scale. 
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5.5.3. Storage Deposits 
According to the IEA, Slovnaft operates storage facilities with a capacity of 310,000 
tons and 430,000 tons, respectively. Transpetrol, Slovnaft and ASMR (Administration 
of the State Material Reserves) hold Slovakia’s emergency reserves of crude oil and 
oil products. 
SAPPO lists 11 large storage deposits: three of them are linked to the Czech Repub-
lic by product pipeline, the others can be supplied by rail. These 11 deposits are sup-
posedly in private hands and account for 35,000-37,000 m³. Slovnaft has an addi-
tional 40,000 m³ in tank farms; they are the distribution centres for the supply of the 
company’s sales points. 
5.5.4. Conclusions for Slovakia 
Slovnaft’s position on the refining market is obvious: The company runs the sole re-
fining unit in the Slovak Republic. With regards to wholesale, the IEA stated in 2005 
that Slovnaft dominates the Slovak wholesale market, holding a market share of 70-
72% in the wholesale of motor fuels. This seems plausible as imports equate to ap-
proximately 25%-30% of domestic demand.  
Imports may principally be obtained on behalf of local and global majors active in the 
Slovak fuel retail market. There are no logistical obstacles associated with imports as 
the country is highly integrated, open to neighbouring markets. Even though, restric-
tions are in place. Majors like Shell and Agip might not hold sufficient capacity in di-
rect vicinity to enlarge their market shares. Only OMV’s Schwechat Refinery pro-
duces within reasonable distance to challenge Slovnaft. After the takeover of Slovnaft 
by MOL in 2001 the Slovak Anti-Monopoly Office imposed restrictions on Slovnaft 
with effect from 2005, limiting its maximum number of service stations throughout the 
country in order to retain competition. 
In conclusion, Slovnaft and its owner MOL are in a comfortable position in Slovakia. 
The refining site in Bratislava is conveniently located; it is fed by two crude oil pipe-
lines that offer additional capacity and is connected to a product pipeline network 
running through Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the location on the 
Danube allows products to be efficiently transported by barge to Austria and Hungary 
or even Serbia. Somehow the overall picture resembles the one drawn for Hungary: 
A sole refinery, efficient and technically up-to-date, owned by a firm that is dominant 
on the domestic market. Furthermore, refining capacity exceeds domestic consump-
tion and forecasts say this is not really to change. Spare capacity enables the large-
scale export of oil, facilitated by the favourable location of the refining site. 
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5.6. Czech Republic 
 
FIGURE 20: CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
Crude oil supply occurs through the Druzhba pipeline of Transneft and via MERO 
pipeline, a branch of the Trans Alpine Pipeline that reaches the country via Germany. 
The refineries are fed by MERO and Druzhba (Litvínov), with only the refineries in 
Kralupy receiving its feedstock through both pipelines. Kralupy and Litvínov feed their 
produce into a countrywide network of product pipelines.  
The Paramo refinery depends on Russian and domestic supplies. Crude oil imports 
to the Czech Republic amounted to 7.2 m in 2007, according to the Czech Oil Indus-
try Association, 64.6% of which arrived through Druzhba while the rest was delivered 
through MERO. 227,000 tons of crude oil were produced at home.  
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The origins of crude were the following, depicted in FIGURE 21 
 
Crude oil (thous. tonnes) 
Russia 4,498 
Azerbaijan 2,072 
Algeria 309 
Kazakhstan 258 
Libya 53 
  7,188 
TABLE 27: CZECH REPUBLIC, CRUDE OIL ORIGINS 
 
Origins of crude oil imports 2007
Russia
Azerbaijan
Algeria
Kazakhstan
Libya
 
FIGURE 21: CZECH REPUBLIC, CRUDE OIL ORIGINS 
 
9.9 m tons of mineral oil were consumed in 200736, so domestic refining could cover 
almost all of the demand. The evolution of consumption over time can be seen in 
FIGURE 22 below. After peaking in the Seventies, consumption declined steadily until 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, at which time consumption began to pick up again, 
reaching about 10 m tons per year. 
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 BP “Statistical Review 2008” Referring to inland demand plus international aviation and marine bun-
kers and refinery fuel and loss. Consumption of fuel ethanol and biodiesel is also included. 
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FIGURE 22: CZECH REPUBLIC, OIL CONSUMPTION 
 
3,242 thousand tons of petroleum products were imported in 2007 (66.2% of which 
were motor fuels), while exports reached 1,108 thousand tons, about half of which 
were petrol or diesel. 
5.6.1. Refining 
The Czech Republic had a refining capacity of 9.3 m tons37 in 2007, 3 refining sites 
are located in the Czech Republic: 2 refineries in Litvínov and Kralupy, run by Ceská 
Rafinérská, and one owned by the company Paramo situated in Pardubice. Kralupy 
is a city in the province of Central Bohemian; Litvínov is located in Ústí nad Labem 
close to Germany. TABLE 28 provides the details. 
 
Company Refining 
sites 
Nameplate capacity Share in 
Equity 
Location Distillation 
Capacity 
Total Market 
share 
    in m tons in %   in m tons   in % 
Česká Rafinérská  Litvínov 5.90 100.00% Litvínov 5.90    
Kralupy 2.70 100.00% Kralupy 2.70 8.60 92.47% 
Paramo Pardubice 0.70 100.00% Pardubice 0.70 0.70 7.53% 
TOTAL      9.30 100.00% 
TABLE 28: CZECH REFINERIES 
 
                                            
 
37
 According to the EIA „World Crude Oil Distillation Capacity, January 1, 1970 - January 1, 2008 ” 
Data from BP and EIA 
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The list of Czech refiners is short but things are not that simple: Ownership structure 
is outlined in FIGURE 23 below. In fact, the three refineries are controlled by Unipetrol, 
which in turn is controlled by the Polish PKN Orlen holding.  
 
FIGURE 23: CZECH REPUBLIC, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE REFINING INDUSTRY 
 
Czech refining capacity is almost entirely controlled by one firm. In order to assess if 
the Unipetrol group can exercise its market power, evidence for the Czech Republic 
being the relevant geographic market has to be provided. Information on the share of 
domestic production and foreign trade provided by TABLE 29 can help. 
 
Domestic production vs. Imports 2007 
  
 Domestic production Imports Total Exports 
Domestic 
deliveries 
  in t in % in t in % in t in t in t 
Gasoline              
Petrol       1,555,000    69.3%        688,000 30.7%       2,243,000 194,000      2,092,000 
Middle distillates             
Turbine fuel         145,000    36.8%        249,000    63.2%         394,000              2,000            373,000    
Diesel        2,918,000    65.4%     1,543,000    34.6%       4,461,000          299,000         4,105,000    
Fuel oils         417,000    77.9%        118,000    22.1%         535,000          145,000            374,000    
Other              
       2,735,000    82.0%        599,000    18.0%       3,334,000    359,000         2,684,000    
TOTAL 2007       7,770,000    70.8%     3,197,000    29.2%     10,967,000      999,000      9,628,000    
TOTAL 2006          8,181,000    74.1%       2,865,000    25.9%       11,046,000    
            
1,134,000           9,679,000    
 Source: Czech Association of Petroleum Industry and Trade       
TABLE 29: CZECH DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 2007 
PKN Orlen Free float 
Unipetrol 
Paramo 
ENI Shell 
Ceská Rafi-
nérská 
37.10% 
88.30% 
51.23% 
16.33% 32.40% 
62.99% 
3.73% 
8.24% 
Other 
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30% of domestic consumption was delivered from abroad; a considerable depend-
ence on imports can only be ascertained concerning turbine fuels, more than half of 
which had to be imported. Exports are declining in step with domestic production, in 
part due to extensive maintenance and modernization operations. 
Output of the Czech refineries 
20,01%
1,87%
37,55%
5,37%
35,20%
Petrol 
Turbine fuel
Diesel 
Fuel oils
Other
 
FIGURE 24: CZECH REFINERIES’ OUTPUT STRUCTURE 
 
FIGURE 24 above illustrates the output structure of the Czech refineries. The main 
products are diesel (38%) and petrol (20%).  
The most important supplier countries in 2007 were Slovakia, Germany and Austria. 
Imports from Slovakia accounted for half of total imports and comprised petrol, diesel 
and fuel oil. Germany supplied naphtha, turbine fuel and diesel and 35% of imported 
products come from Germany. Austria’s share was 5%, delivering diesel, petrol and 
bitumen. Its share is expected to quadruple by 2009. The remaining 10% of imports 
came from Poland, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. Imports of oil products showed 
an upward trend, especially the demand for diesel, jet fuel, lubricating oils and bio-
components. 
When it comes to exports, the main export target countries are mentioned above. 
Poland and Austria each account for a quarter of Czech oil product exports, followed 
by Slovakia and Germany both accounting for a bit less than a quarter. The products 
exported are fuel oil (for Germany), diesel fuel and petrol. Applying the Elzinga-
Hoggarty test for geographic market definition, the LIFO and LOFI values, given in 
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TABLE 30, are quite high. The LOFI value in particular comes close to the arbitrarily 
chosen threshold of 0.9. The EC talks about having found the geographic market, but 
this conclusion has to be handled with care. 
 
LIFO     
  2007 2006 
  0.70 0.73 
LOFI    
  2007 2006 
  0.87 0.86 
TABLE 30: CZECH REPUBLIC, LIFO&LOFI VALUES 
 
5.6.2. Transport 
2500 service stations sell two or more types of motor fuels and have to be supplied 
with the latter; this is done via a comfortable network of product pipelines and distri-
bution facilities throughout the country. Distribution facilities cover equipment to load 
tank trucks and tank wagons with produce from the pipelines. Those facilities are 
held by Čepro, a publicly owned firm. 
Crude oil pipelines 
 
Druzhba 
The southern branch of Druzhba has the capacity to transport 10 m tons per year. 
Untill the IKL pipeline was completed in the Nineties, Druzhba was the only supplying 
pipeline with almost 9 m tons of throughput per year. 
IKL/MERO 
IKL is the abbreviation for “Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvínov Pipeline”, although it does not 
run through the mentioned cities but ends in a deposit in Nelahozeves near Prague. 
The pipeline is operated by the MERO Pipeline GmbH, a state-driven company. It 
also runs the Druzhba on Czech territory. IKL’s nameplate capacity amounts to 10 m 
tons per year but capacity did not get exhausted until very recently. 
Product pipelines 
Products are delivered through a network of product pipelines with adjacent deposits 
or facilities to reload to tank wagons or lorries. There is also a product pipeline pro-
viding the Czech Republic from Bratislava’s Slovnaft refinery. The product pipelines 
are run by Čepro. 
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5.6.3. Storage Deposits 
The central reserve for crude oil is situated north of Prague in Nelahozeves, where 
both crude oil pipelines end. The reserves are owned and run by ASMR (Administra-
tion of State Material Reserves), while the already mentioned state-owned company 
Čepro owns and runs the facilities. 
5.6.4. Conclusions for Czech Republic 
The refining sector of the Czech Republic tells a story of privatisation and moderniza-
tion that end with a sole supplier of refined products. The Polish PKN Orlen controls 
both firms running processing sites on Czech territory. Paramo is a formerly state 
owned company and only being privatised in 2000 through publicly advertised bid-
ding. The bid was awarded to Unipetrol, because the other bidders could not meet 
the requirements. 49% of Unipetrol’s largest subsidiary, Ceská Rafinérská, had been 
acquired by Shell, ConocoPhillips and Agip/ENI. The government finally began sell-
ing its stakes in Unipetrol on the stock exchange bit by bit from 1997 on. Measures 
were seized to rapidly modernise the premises in order to come up to European fuel 
specifications, while programmes for alternative and sulphur-free automotive fuels 
are on the way. 
The entire refining capacity in the Czech Republic is controlled by the majority owner, 
the Polish PKN Orlen. This may raise concerns but even with considerable high LIFO 
and LOFI values, the country is dependent on certain supplies from abroad. The rap-
idly growing demand for diesel cannot be met by domestic production alone, even 
though storage capacity should recover from maintenance shutdowns.  
BP, Esso, TOTAL, OMV and Slovnaft have invested in retail networks of service sta-
tions throughout the whole country. Each of these firms is able to import bulk 
amounts of oil products and step in if the national retailer ceases to supply. The 
MOL-owned Slovnaft in the neighbouring country runs a product pipeline network 
connecting Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In addition to this, Slovnaft has signifi-
cant spare capacity to engage in export business. These facts temper somehow the 
concerns about concentration in the country’s industry. 
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6. Assessment of the Industry 
When collecting data and analyzing the industry in the 6 countries under review, sev-
eral potential scenarios of behaviour detrimental to competition arise. There can be 
firms in a dominant position abusing their market power, there can be collusion be-
tween competitors or certain circumstances could at least favour horizontal collusion. 
Companies operating in the refining market are usually highly vertically integrated: 
That means they have subsidiaries that search for, drill and pump crude oil in the 
name of the company. Other company divisions may engage in oil refining, distribu-
tion and storage of feedstock and products until the products get sold in wholesale or 
retail markets, through filling stations acting under the same brand. This high degree 
of vertical integration may cause problems like vertical foreclosure, exclusive con-
tracting, price squeezing or the threat of price wars when new firms enter also exist-
ing markets. Furthermore, the probability of market entry and the issue of “essential 
facilities” have to be reviewed. 
Final definition of the relevant geographic market 
Each of the countries that has been analysed separately so far does not necessarily 
represent relevant geographic markets. It is necessary to decide which areas do form 
a common market for refined products and which should be disregarded. A simple 
justification for the fact that markets for refined products should be broader than na-
tional markets is that there are countries in Europe without relevant domestic refining 
capacity. Relevant in this case means that a substantial part of domestic demand can 
be met by domestic production. Countries like Slovenia (which has been left out for 
this reason), Latvia or Estonia import all products demanded from refining sites 
abroad. 
The national markets of Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are all 
considered part of the refining market in Central and Eastern Europe, the relevant 
geographic market. Austria is dependent on imports of products on a large scale and 
the Austrian major OMV is engaged in refining and marketing in all of the other 5 
countries. The Czech Republic has strong ties with Slovakia, with its exports making 
up a third of the industry’s production. The Hungarian MOL runs refineries in Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Italy and retailing holds market shares in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Moreover MOL is striving to increase its share of the Austrian retail market. 
Italy and Germany with their large oil refining industry constitute a competitive con-
straint on competitors in the aforementioned countries. The highly vertically inte-
grated oil companies Agip/ENI, BP, ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell run refineries 
in the two countries. Agip/ENI and ExxonMobil hold equity in refining capacity in both 
countries, while BP and Shell only do so in Germany. Each of these companies op-
80 
erates a network of filling stations throughout the market and their refining sites are 
supposed to supply its subsidiary companies in the four smaller countries. 
TABLE 31 below comes up with the Lifo and Lofi values of the countries concerned. 
No country passes the test that is achieving values of at least 0.9 in both tests, in the 
little-in-from-outside test and the little-out-from-inside test. It is easy to spot that Slo-
vakia is the most open economy, when it comes to the oil industry. 
 
Austria       Hungary     
  2007 2006     2007   
LIFO 0.47 0.49  LIFO 0.67   
LOFI 0.73 0.79  LOFI 0.63   
Czech Republic     Italy     
  2007 2006     2007 2006 
LIFO 0.70 0.73  LIFO 0.84 0.89 
LOFI 0.87 0.86  LOFI 0.70 0.74 
Germany       Slovakia     
  2007 2006     2007 2006 
LIFO 0.85 0.80  LIFO 0.38 0.39 
LOFI 0.77 0.78   LOFI 0.25 0.25 
TABLE 31: LIFO AND LOFI VALUES OF THE ANALYSED COUNTRIES 
 
Germany and Italy cannot be considered as entirely belonging to the geographic 
market: Exports clearly have to be forwarded to the country of destination and trans-
port is costly, even more so if certain means of transport are unavailable – product 
pipelines or waterways both show decreasing cost with rising distances. Hence 
transport by railway, or even more expensively by tank truck is necessary, and the 
incentive to keep transit short to keep down costs is dominant. 
Territories along the Austrian/Czech border can of course be seen as integral part of 
the market, whereas refining spots in northern Germany or southern Italy are of no 
relevance. Oil products from Sicily would have to be brought to harbours in the north 
of Italy to be reloaded to tank wagons or trucks. Handling bulk loads is expensive as 
is changing means of transport. For this reason, I regard only the refining sites in the 
north of Italy as being part of the market in question. I take a similar stance with 
Germany: The region Gelsenkirchen/Cologne in the west remains part of the market 
as these refineries are located on the Rhine and transportation by barge can be per-
formed on a large scale. All sites further to the north are excluded whereas the refin-
eries in Spergau, eastern Germany can deliver their produce to the general vicinity of 
the German/Czech border via MIPRO product pipeline. FIGURE 25 below gives the 
outline of the relevant geographic market. 
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FIGURE 25: THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET 
 
I would like to conclude this section by detailing the following companies which con-
stitute the relevant market and whose definition is based on information on trade 
flows and the feasibility of transport of bulk loads and the “threat” of exports into the 
neighbouring countries. 
Table 32 below lists the companies wholly or partly owning the stakes in refineries. 
Details on crude oil refining capacity and the owning firms’ absolute and relative 
shares in total capacity, amounting to 136 m tons per year, are given. Equity share is 
reflected in the share in distillation capacity a refining site provides. The table comes 
up with 18 different refining sites owned by 14 different companies. The refining sites 
are arranged with respect to the owning company. 
Holding equity in shares of a refining site can be regarded as a share in capacity of 
the refinery. All of the mentioned firm are operating in retail or wholesale of refined 
products. Holding equity does imply collaborate in the management of a site, thus 
knowledge in running a refinery is crucial. 
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Company Refining sites 
Nameplate 
capacity 
Share in 
Equity 
Location 
Distillation 
Capacity 
Total 
Market 
share 
    in m tons in %   in m tons in % 
OMV Schwechat 10.00 100.00% Schwechat 10.00    
  Bayernoil 12.00 45.00% Ingolstadt 5.40    
  Burghausen 3.40 100.00% Burghausen 3.40 18.80 13.75% 
          
PKN Orlen  
5.40 100.00% Litvínov 5.90 
 
  Česká Rafinérská 
  
Litvínov 
Kralupy 3.30 100.00% Kralupy 2.70    
PARAMO Pardubice 0.70 100.00% Pardubice 0.70 9.30 6.80% 
          
Shell MIRO  14.90 32.25% Karlsruhe 4.81    
  
Rheinland Refine-
ry 17.00 100.00% Cologne 17.00 21.81 15.95% 
          
BP Bayernoil 10.00 22.50% Ingolstadt 2.25    
  MIRO  14.90 12.00% Karlsruhe 1.79    
  Ruhröl Refinery 12.90 50.00% Gelsenkirchen 6.45 10.49 7.67% 
          
ConocoPhillips MIRO  14.90 18.75% Karlsruhe 2.79 2.79 2.04% 
          
TOTAL 
Mitteldeutschland 
Refinery 12.00 100.00% Spergau 12.00 12.00 8.78% 
          
PDVSA Bayernoil 12.00 12.50% Ingolstadt 1.50    
  Ruhröl Refinery 12.90 50.00% Gelsenkirchen 6.45 7.95 5.82% 
          
Petroplus 
Ingolstadt Refine-
ry 5.00 100.00% Ingolstadt 5.00 5.00 3.66% 
        
MOL Duna Refinery 8.10 100.00% Százhalombatta 8.10    
Slovnaft/MOL Slovnaft Refinery 5.80 100.00% Bratislava 5.80    
  Mantova 2.60 100.00% Mantova 2.60 16.50 12.07% 
          
Agip/ENI Sannazzaro 8.50 100.00% Sannazzaro 8.50    
  Venice 4.20 100.00% Venice 4.20    
  Bayernoil 12.00 20.00% Ingolstadt 2.40 15.10 11.05% 
          
Esso/ExxonMobil Sarpom Refinery 8.75 75.40% Trecate 6.60    
  MIRO  14.90 25.00% Karlsruhe 3.73 10.32 7.55% 
          
Tamoil Cremona 4.50 100.00% Cremona 4.50 4.50 3.29% 
          
ERG Petroli Sarpom Refinery 8.75 24.60% Trecate 2.15 2.15 1.57% 
TOTAL         136.71 136.71 100.00% 
TABLE 32: MARKET SHARES OF THE WHOLE MARKET 
 
Shell is the market leader with 16%, followed by OMV with 14%, MOL 12% and 
Agip/ENI 11%. Now that the relevant geographic market is finally defined, concentra-
tion measures can be applied and further analysis performed. 
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6.1. Assessment of market power 
“Market power is defined as the ability of a firm to raise prices above its 
marginal cost”38 
 
The concise definition above is true only when several restrictions are taken into 
consideration. Firms without any market power can only be found in the abstract 
world of the Bertrand model with symmetric firms and homogenous goods – in a case 
of perfect competition. In the real world, every company is supposed to have market 
power to some extent; if not it is sincerely striving to obtain it. 
A good measure for market power is the Lerner index, defined as the firm’s mark-up, 
given by the ratio of the difference between price and marginal cost divided by the 
price of good i, pi minus the marginal cost of good I, ci 
i
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When trying to apply the Lerner index one encounters two main difficulties: Data for 
marginal costs are rarely available and hard to estimate. Moreover, the productive 
inefficiencies of a monopolist lead to higher costs and the case could arise that the 
Lerner index might find that even a monopolist is not dominant due to its costs ex-
ceeding the competitive level. 
The traditional approach to assess market power includes several other variables 
which act as indicators: Shares of leading firms in a market, the relative position of 
competitors, potential entrants and the countervailing power of buyers.  
6.1.1. Market shares 
Analysing market share is a key point when analysing market power in an industry. A 
firm’s high market share is does not suffice as evidence of its market dominance. If 
entry into the industry is easy or there are only a few buyers that exercise strong 
buyer power, a firm with a high market share would not be in a position to raise 
prices above the competitive level. 
Regarding measures of market power always involves the question for certain 
thresholds. The most precise statement is given in the “Assessment of Market 
Power” Guidelines by the UK Office of Fair Trading: 
                                            
 
38
 Motta (2007), p. 115 
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..“below 40% it is unlikely that a firm is considered dominant; above 50% 
dominance can be presumed”39 
 
The EC does not set such explicit thresholds for market shares, but it is following the 
same practice. In cases where market share falls between 40%-50%, other evidence 
is used to support a decision – information on buyers’ power and excess capacities 
for instance. A firm with a market share below 25% can be presumed not to be in a 
dominant position. EC merger guidelines do suggest that concentration is presumed 
not to impede competition if the combined market share of the two merging firms 
does not exceed 25%. 
It can easily be calculated that the market shares in the table above do not raise se-
rious concerns about competition at this time. The largest company, Shell holds 
about 16% and there are a few other firms holding a somewhat smaller share. A 
merger of two of the bigger companies though could attract the attention of the Euro-
pean Commission: OMV and MOL for instance would come up to slightly more than 
25%. In 2008, when such a takeover was on the cards, an investigation of the com-
petitive environment was initiated. 
In addition to the pure market shares that provide a rather snap-shot picture, there 
should also be recourse to other information. Theory suggests drawing on reserves 
of inputs (in this case of crude oil) to assess how consistent the positions in the mar-
ket are. However, those reserves are as hard to put into concrete figures as licenses 
for drilling spots and estimates for the oil deposits are. 
In the refining industry, the model of a highly vertically integrated company prevails. 
Many firms sell their own fuels under the same brand under which it had been refined 
and its raw material, crude mineral oil, had been produced. Major companies lacking 
their own supply in an area but running a retail network tend to hold stakes in local 
refineries or are supplied on the basis of payroll processing contracts. If prices are 
set too high, the threat of import of products, though expensive, has an effect on 
wholesalers meaning that a lack of buyers’ power is not a major issue. 
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6.1.2. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index HHI40 
This index is one of the most commonly used concentration measures; it often gets 
used in the assessment of mergers by competition authorities. The HHI is a simple 
summary statistic of the level of concentration in an industry. It takes account of the 
whole industry and is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in 
a defined market. 
N
i
iSHHI
1
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N is the number of firms of an industry, Si is the market share of firm i. The index 
takes values from zero – an infinitely large number of firms holding zero market share 
– to 10,000 with only one firm holding a 100% market share. 
Again other factors have to be kept in mind when interpreting the results of the statis-
tic. A firm could have achieved a high market share thanks to an advantage in tech-
nology and/or efficiency, market structure has to be taken as partly endogenously 
determined, and therefore the number of firms is not a sufficient indicator for the level 
of competition in a market. 
A proper definition of the relevant market is the most important prerequisite for the 
HHI to reflect the level of concentration in an unbiased way.  
EU merger guidelines offer some threshold values for the interpretation of the ob-
served HHI: 
 
The Commission is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a 
market with a post-merger HHI below 1,000. Such markets normally do 
not require extensive analysis.41 
 
The EC further gives values for the change in HHI, the ΔHHI, which is not of impor-
tance in our case. The EC Merger Guidelines finds a market with a HHI of between 
1,000 and 2,00042 as “unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns“. A HHI ex-
ceeding 2,000 is an indication for high concentration. The US Merger Guidelines sets 
a lower threshold at 1,800. 
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 European Commission, “Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings”, (2004), §19 
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 ibid. §20 
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In the case of the refining industry within the defined geographic market, the HHI is 
calculated as follows: 
1058²
13
1i
iSHHI
 
A HHI of 1,058 points to at most a moderate concentration in the market concerned. 
Again, a merger of two of the bigger firms could raise concerns in the EC, as it was 
the case with OMV/MOL. 
 
6.2. Horizontal Collusion 
Though there are no reasonable grounds for regarding the refining industry in the 
market under review, as being afflicted, I would still like to take a brief look at the pa-
rameters favouring horizontal collusion. 
Motta defines two elements that must prevail for collusion to arise: 
 
 Participants must have the opportunity to observe deviation in a timely way 
 There must be punishment (a price war) 
 
He states further that collusion can only be able only if firms meet repeatedly in the 
market. Factors influencing the probability of collusion are as follows. 
Small number of firms 
In contrast to an industry with many active companies, where deviating from a collu-
sive agreement is more attractive, in a sector with only a small number of firms the 
profit from deviating would hardly outweigh the punishment. In addition to this, a 
small number of firms eases coordination among the members of the cartel. 
Symmetries in the industry 
When calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, one can observe that this meas-
ure of concentration rises with asymmetries in the industry. According to Motta 
(2007) 
“one should expect an ambiguous relationship between concentration and 
collusion: such a measure confounds two factors – higher average market 
share and asymmetry – that affect collusion in opposite ways.”43 
 
                                            
 
43
 Motta (2007), p. 143 
87 
A market with two firms, both holding 50% market shares, is evaluated with a HHI of 
5,000. A market with two firms operating, one being dominant with 90% market share 
and the other holding only 10% results in a HHI of 8,200, which is much closer to 
monopolisation. 
Though the first situation would be more critical, with regard to collusion, in the latter 
scenario the incentive for the market can be regarded to be high. Whether the small 
firm can threaten the market leader with effective punishment or is able to deviate 
oneself depends on capacity constraints. If no capacity constraints exist, the smaller 
firm has more incentive to deviate as it has little to lose and much to gain. To sum up, 
to assess the impact of symmetries on competition necessitates collecting further 
information about capacity constraints. 
Buyer power 
In the case of many suppliers and only few potential buyers, buyers’ power is estab-
lished. In such a market, sellers will refrain from collusive practices. When small, fre-
quent orders are grouped into large and sporadic ones, the buyer can even break a 
collusive agreement as the incentive to deviate soars. 
Concentration  
A small number of firms holding substantial market shares clearly favours collusion; 
the same is true for symmetry and a higher average market share. A small number of 
competitors eases coming to a collusive agreement.  
Probability of entry 
The feasibility of entry of new firms into the industry is another key issue when as-
sessing the competitiveness of oil refining industry. Legal provisions such as customs 
and industrial regulation, switching costs and lock-in effects are obstacles to potential 
entrants. The main obstacle arises when significant sunk costs accrue; this is obvi-
ously the case. Vast levels of investment in refining equipment and technology are 
necessary, not to mention the provisions needed to assure supply with crude oil 
(pipelines, harbours). Although an Italian refinery had been sold and relocated to 
Pakistan, such investment can be considered as not being easy to redeem. Again, 
the higher the probability of entry of new firms and the lower entry barriers to fore-
close entrants, the worse the circumstances for collusive agreements.  
Cross-ownership 
Cross-ownership among competitors facilitates the exchange of information on prices 
and amounts and helps the firms monitoring each other to detect deviational behav-
iour. Cross-ownership has not been observed in the market for the time being except 
for certain refining sites and pipeline systems. 
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Demand price elasticity 
A low elasticity of demand favours collusion as demand is supposed not to fall as 
rapidly when a trust raises prices. In contrast, high demand elasticity will cause a 
boom in demand after a firm deviates from a collusive agreement by lowering prices. 
The net effect is ambiguous but a lower elasticity will definitely cause a higher mo-
nopoly profit as demand is going down very slowly in reaction to an increase in 
prices. 
Excess capacity 
Excess capacity and technological advantage can serve as supplementary informa-
tion as well. The availability of excess capacity again restricts the exertion of market 
power: If prices are raised, firms with spare capacity can step in and supply new cus-
tomers if their product is substitutable enough. The degree of substitutability of re-
fined products is quite high as long as legal regulations for components (sulphur, bio-
genetic agents) are fulfilled.  
Product homogeneity 
In a market with a large assortment of products, deviation is less profitable; a small 
decrease in price does not necessarily lead to a large shift in demand. On the other 
hand, product homogeneity, as it is more or less the case in the market for refined 
products, favours the entrance of firms from outside the market. Market entry in turn 
impedes collusion. In contrast, market conditions can be considered more transpar-
ent. Deviators from collusive agreements can be detected more easily 
In short, it can be said that there does not seem to be much evidence that collusive 
behaviour occurs on the Central and Eastern European refining market in question. 
Neither the number of firms acting in the market is especially low nor are strong 
symmetries to be observed. There are several firms holding about 10% market share 
ranking behind the leading firms holding 16%, 14% and 12% respectively. 
Cross-ownership has not been observed, except for certain facilities, and should be 
prohibited by law, as refined products can be considered very homogenous and de-
mand elasticity regarding prices is quite low. 
The threat of horizontal collusion seems largely manageable, but authorities should 
remain watchful – observing companies active in the market is easy and retail prices 
of oil products are publicly monitored.  
 
6.3. Vertical integration 
As has been frequently mentioned so far, most firms are vertically integrated to a 
high degree. This implies that most companies sell the oil products derived from 
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crude oil, which they have even explored and produced on their own, through filling 
stations or wholesale under the company’s brand.  
The crucial question in this context is whether vertically integrated firms are willing to 
supply independent retailers and wholesalers, which do not possess their own local 
refining capacity. If independent distributors are supplied, which prices do they have 
to pay? Will the integrated firm increase prices? 
As before, the answers depend on other firms’ ability to step in (e.g. spare capacity), 
the elasticity of demand for the input for the retailing firm which is low (which in turn 
implies low substitutability of products) and the probability of new suppliers entering 
the market. 
Theory does not coercively predict an increase in price of the input for the retailers, 
when the integrated company ceases to supply as competitors could increase their 
output. This brings us back to the question of excess capacity. 
If an integrated firm ceases to supply a good that is considered as input to the down-
stream rivals, this is referred to as vertical foreclosure. If foreclosure occurs, this does 
not necessarily imply that the integrated affiliate in retailing is able to raise prices. 
Retail markets, being competitive enough, could prevent the firm from exercising 
market power and increasing retail prices. For the latter case it is compulsory that 
there exist other upstream firms with excess capacity or entry of new firms occurs – 
then it would not be a case vertical foreclosure. Motta concludes that:  
 
“Vertical restraints and vertical mergers are anti-competitive only if they in-
volve firms endowed with significant market power”44 
 
He also comes up with a proxy to exempt firms from investigation, i.e. firms with a 
market share below 20-30%. 
During the assessment of the market under review, only one such case was ob-
served: the case of MOL in Hungary. The company had increased its wholesale 
prices to a greater extent than the resale prices at its own filling stations. The EC 
prohibited this pricing policy.45 Theory fits quite well to what occurred: Demand elas-
ticity clearly was low – filling stations had to be supplied with the usual fuels. The lo-
cal retail market can be considered, though dominated by MOL, as being sufficiently 
competitive. MOL is dominant in refining, wholesaling and retailing in Hungary. 
                                            
 
44
 Motta (2007), p. 377 
45
 IEA, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, “Hungary 2006 Review”, Paris, 2006, p. 115 
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The independent suppliers found it difficult to get other sources of supply and possi-
bilities for entry did not disclose immediately. In addition to this, the geographical po-
sition of Hungary and the surrounding countries did not offer alternative sources of 
supply: Refineries in the east of the country belonging to another firm than MOL are 
far from being adjacent (Romania, Slovakia) and cross-border trade with the Ukraine 
may not be as simple seeing as the latter is not yet a member of the EU. The case 
represents an exception and is less likely to occur in other areas of the defined geo-
graphical market. In the end, the EC foiled MOL’s intention and barriers to entry fell: 
Hypermarkets stepped into the market and supply from abroad was organized. 
6.3.1. Abusive practices 
There are some abusive practices dominant firms may adopt to deter firms from en-
tering a market or force competitors to exit. In EU legislation those cases get dealt 
with under the headline “abuse of dominance” – incidents commonly occur after the 
liberalisation of an industry: The former state-owned dominant firm faces new com-
petitors and tries to prevent them from gaining market share. 
However exclusionary behaviour can be sometimes be difficult to differentiate from 
competitive actions. Price reductions may result from advantages in efficiency or the 
use of a superior technology but it may also be an attempt to prevent the entrant from 
making profits or to start a price war.  
It is worth taking a closer look at market shares – if the firm using such practices is 
not dominant, the case may be not worth further analysis.  
6.3.2. Essential facilities 
An essential facility is any input which is deemed necessary for all industry partici-
pants to operate in a given industry and which is not easily duplicated. Access to a 
crude oil pipeline could be such an essential facility – a crucial prerequisite for the 
sensible operation of an oil refinery far away from oil harbours or in a land-locked 
country.  
While building new refining premises is regarded as unlikely or even impossible due 
to neighbouring pressure groups, environmental regulation or bad prospects for rea-
sonable capacity utilization, even existing refineries can be regarded as essential 
facilities. The most common example in literature that also may apply to this work is 
the case of specifically equipped ports. In contrast, facilities that provide only a minor 
advantage (e.g. deposits in the vicinity of the port of lading) cannot be accounted for. 
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The EC demands certain criteria to be met to declare a facility to be “essential”.46 
 
 The facility has to be “impossible” to replicate – it has to be assessed whether 
another similar facility can be developed. It also may be not viable to create a 
second, similar asset. If the asset can be replicated at reasonable cost, the 
entrant should set up its own assets. Non-consideration could provide an in-
centive to free-ride when it comes to risky investments. 
 There has to be no alternative way to enter the relevant market at a reason-
able cost. 
 There must be spare capacity on the asset – if no spare capacity exists, per-
mitting access does not raise competition.  
 There must be a lack of effective competition on the downstream market and a 
reasonable expectation that providing access to the facility improves the level 
of downstream competition. 
 
The EC has been prepared to examine cases where the issue “essential facilities” 
arise though caution is due. Possible alternatives or existing spare capacity have to 
be considered before access to a facility is officially granted to a rival. 
The reasons for being cautious in issuing obligations to share access are 
 Such obligations curtail the property rights of the owner 
 Firms get discouraged from investing into facilities and thereby from taking risk 
The “essential facilities” problem arises in some cases of deregulation of former pub-
licly owned premises and there has to be a difference made between rights of use, 
which can be redistributed, and investment in property. 
A refinery can not be regarded as an essential facility because construction of a new 
site is viable (e.g. Sicily or the refinery in Spergau, Germany), even two or more refin-
ing sites in immediate vicinity is possible. With regard to crude oil pipelines things are 
a bit different: replicating a pipeline taking exactly the same route is not economically 
viable and using transport by pipeline may be without alternative. If there is spare 
capacity on a pipeline has to be decided from case to case. It is obvious that any en-
trant can not force a firm to curtail its throughput in order to free capacity. The last 
condition is hard to be met: markets for refined products are largely outlined and 
markets can be supplied, even if there exists no local refining site. 
                                            
 
46
 Bishop, S. and Walker, M., (2002) p. 241-244 
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With regards to the industry under review, two rather radical approaches seem to be 
self-evident. A potential entrant either has to buy shares in existing refineries oper-
ated by a different firm or the entrant must take the risk of building a completely new 
refining site in a European country, maybe one in the east that does not currently 
exhaust its carbon dioxide emission rights. The first track may be the more plausible 
as investing into a complete new site entails considerable sunk costs and risks. Simi-
larly, a supply of crude oil has to be arranged. The entrant would have to buy into an 
existing pipeline network as service is costly and freeloaders are not usually wel-
come. The question of existing spare capacity arises again with this particular issue. 
The public sector is unlikely to enforce access to pipelines, as they have been pri-
vately financed in the past and national states are not likely to engage in such activi-
ties in the future. Furthermore, erecting new oil refineries is of questionable foresight 
– Europe suffers from surplus capacity in the area of refining and processing crude 
oil might be done in the oil-exporting countries in the future. 
 
6.4. Challenges for the European Refining Industry – Conclusions 
The relevant markets have been defined applying the Elzinga-Hogarty test regarding 
foreign trade flows, considering transport costs and the availability of means for bulk 
transportation. In addition to this, EC decisions have been revised and the definition 
seems to fit. 
After having accurately defined the relevant markets, market shares were calculated. 
It turned out that the industry, consisting of 13 firms, is at most moderately concen-
trated and the status quo should not raise concerns with regard to competition. 
However, may things change and a merger of two of the bigger companies should be 
viewed with caution as it could raise the market’s concentration significantly and thus 
increasing the probability of horizontal collusion. Collusion at this time is not very 
likely, although such conditions have been met such as the possibility to observe de-
viation of a cartel member and the chance for punishment. 
However, the number of firms is not low, there are no striking symmetries and retail 
prices are monitored by the public authorities. 
Vertical integration of companies operating in the market is high and foreclosure of 
firms is theoretically possible. The Hungarian MOL started an attempt in 2005 to 
squeeze competitors out of the wholesale market for refined products. MOL’s pricing 
policy was prohibited by the EC and the entry of new retailers with alternative 
sources of supply helped to stimulate competition. Certain products were concerned 
in a certain area of Hungary that is supposed to be the east of the country along the 
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border with Ukraine and Romania, which at that point in time was not a member of 
the EU. Being member of the common market in the EU can significantly facilitate 
cross-border trade. 
In general each region of the market under review is within easy reach of a number 
of refineries, a fact that helps to ensure effective competition. Additionally, suspicion 
of collusion and vertical foreclosure can be mitigated by the existence of firms hold-
ing less than 20-30% market share. These thresholds have evidently not been ex-
ceeded; the largest market share of a firm is 16% followed by three competitors hold-
ing between 15-10%. 
The feasibility of market entry eases concerns about anti-competitive behaviour. Bar-
riers may arise from the large investment required that can be regarded as sunk 
costs or environmental regulation. Building new oil refining sites without abandoning 
other premises is not likely to occur. However, buying existing facilities from a firm 
already involved in refining is practicable.  
Citing the example of Petroplus, a former Dutch and now Swiss refining operator, it 
entered the market in 1993, bought several refineries throughout Europe in recent 
years and boasts to be “Europe’s largest independent oil refinery operator” which 
appears to be the case. The firm’s equity is held by several investment funds and is 
also free-floating. This example shows that entry is feasible although the industry is 
ruled by the “traditional” highly vertically and horizontally integrated oil companies like 
BP, ExxonMobil, Shell or ENI. 
Regardless of this fact, there are several challenges for the industry to meet. They 
arise regarding the output structure of Europe’s refineries and regarding the industry 
itself. 
Europe has a chronic deficit in diesel production; diesel fuel even gets imported from 
the USA despite the distance. The deficit is in part caused by the lack of conversion 
capacity in European refineries. Conversion capacity makes it possible to increase 
the yield of light products such as diesel and enhance the output flexibility of com-
bined production. The USA might have an advantage in this area because it proc-
esses the heavy, high sulphur crudes of the Middle East, whereas Europe prefers the 
lighter crude oils. The other factor is the preponderance of diesel-driven cars in the 
countries throughout Europe – production levels sometimes just do not meet the de-
mand for diesel fuel. 
Another big challenge for the industry is the permanent surplus capacity throughout 
Europe. In 2002 an EU-wide demand for 548 m tons contrasted with a capacity of 
672 m tons. This is due in part to the tendency of oil refineries to migrate to oil-
producing countries, which seek to increase their share of the value added. 
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This spare capacity temper competition concerns in the market, as there is sufficient 
capacity to counter a firm increasing prices. However, surplus capacity costs money 
and will not persist in the medium run. 
Some inputs needed in the industry, like crude oil pipelines or even refining plants, 
can under certain circumstances be regarded as essential facilities without which no 
output can be produced. However, if entry into the industry or into a new operating 
area occurs, it is necessary to invest in pipelines and to ensure supply with feedstock 
for example and is deemed feasible. 
It was noted that storage deposits and transportation are organized at a national level 
and are mostly dominated by the largest firm in the country.  
However, it may be possible to gain a share in crucial companies or facilities. If ef-
forts fail, politics may hurry to help, because ensuring “the reasonable supply of fuels 
to the population” is always a good pledge for any election. 
Politics shall be the last point of my conclusion. Its role cannot be disregarded in the 
oil industry. Some companies are still part owned by the state and the idea of main-
taining a national champion that calmly ensures supply is still popular. At the very 
least, a certain share should belong to domestic or “friendly” investors. Russian oil 
majors seeking to increase the vertical integration of their companies are not consid-
ered welcome by either the EU or national governments due to the recent disruptions 
to the supply of natural gas. But if the industry consolidates and companies have to 
be rapidly sold, things may change. 
The picture drawn by the analysis carried out here does not reveal any serious 
threats to competition, but several events have shown that the industry must be 
closely monitored by national and European authorities. 
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7. Appendix 
7.1. German summary/ Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Bei der vorliegenden Diplomarbeit handelt es sich um eine Industriestudie, die einen 
Einblick in die Ölindustrie, genauer die Raffination von Mineralölen und den Verkauf 
der Erzeugnisse im Großhandel. Um die Bewältigung dieses Vorhabens im Rahmen 
einer Diplomarbeit zu gewährleisten, habe ich mich auf den Raffineriemarkt in Mittel- 
und Osteuropa konzentriert, mit Österreich im Zentrum.  
Untersucht werden soll die Wettbewerbssituation zwischen den verschiedenen Un-
ternehmen, die ihre Produkte im Groß- und Einzelhandel an Zwischenhändler bzw. 
die Endverbraucher vertreiben. 
Nach einer Einführung in die Industrie, in der Probleme Europäischer Dimension an-
gesprochen werden, wie Überkapazitäten, fehlende Konversionskapazitäten und 
dem daraus resultierenden Mangel an Dieseltreibstoff werden grundlegende techni-
sche Vorgänge der Raffination von Mineralöl im industriellen Maßstab erklärt. 
Die folgende Definition der relevanten Märkte ist von großer Bedeutung für die an-
schließende wettbewerbsökonomische Untersuchung: Wird der Markt zu „weit“ fest-
gelegt, das heißt werden Regionen oder Produkte inkludiert, die in der Tat eigene 
Märkte darstellen, so wird eine wettbewerbspolitisch Besorgnis erregende Situation 
womöglich als unbedenklich angesehen. Umgekehrt, können bei zu „enger“ Marktde-
finition Bedrohungen für den Wettbewerb – etwa in der Form hoher Konzentration – 
festgestellt werden, obwohl andere, nicht eingeschlossene Produkte oder Gebiete 
den Wettbewerb aufrechterhalten. 
Das Konzept des SSNIP-Tests wird eingeführt, hierbei wird gefragt, ob es für einen 
etwaigen Monopolist profitabel wäre, seine Preise dauerhaft um 5-10% zu erhöhen. 
Da dieses Konzept aus Mangel an Daten nicht anwendbar ist, müssen Indizien ge-
sammelt werden um die Gestalt der relevanten Produktmärkte sowie der relevanten 
geografischen Märkte abzugrenzen. Durch die Analyse möglicher Transportmittel 
und Wege für den Transport von Rohöl und Mineralölprodukten, die niedrige Eigen-
preiselastizität von Diesel und Benzin wird der Schluss gezogen, dass Rohöl und 
durch Raffination erzeugte Produkte als nicht im selben Markt befindlich anzusehen 
sind. Mit Hilfe des Elzinga-Hogarty-Tests, der Handelsströme untersucht und der 
Durchsicht relevanter Entscheidungen der EC wird ein durch Österreich, Tschechien, 
Slowakei, Ungarn und Teilen Italiens’ und Deutschlands’ konstituierter geografischer 
Markt abgegrenzt. 
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In der Folge werden die genannten Länder einzeln hinsichtlich Raffinerien, deren 
Eigentümer, Kapazitäten und Produktion, untersucht. Auch der Transport und die 
Lagerung von Rohöl und Fertigprodukten wird einer Analyse unterzogen. Der       
Elzinga-Hogarty Test ergibt, dass keines der Länder einen eigenen Markt für sich 
darstellt und in der Folge wird der relevante Markt konkret abgegrenzt. Für diesen 
Markt werden Marktanteile und Konzentrationsmaße berechnet, kein Unternehmen 
hat jedoch eine marktbeherrschende Stellung inne. Eine Fusion von zwei der größten 
Unternehmen würde jedoch eine Untersuchung der EC auslösen. Absprachen zwi-
schen den Marktteilnehmern sind eher nicht wahrscheinlich, da Preise behördlich 
beobachtet werden und Markteintritte neuer Konkurrenten sowohl im Einzel- als auch 
im Großhandel möglich sind. Durch die, sowohl horizontal als auch vertikal in hohem 
Maße integrierten, Unternehmen kam es in der Vergangenheit zu Versuchen Mitbe-
werber vom Markt zu drängen oder deren Eintritt gar nicht erst zuzulassen. Solche, 
den Wettbewerb schädigenden, Praktiken sind auch in Zukunft möglich und müssen 
von den Behörden dementsprechend verhindert und geahndet werden.  
Am Ende der Arbeit wird außer auf den Wettbewerb betreffende Belange, noch auf 
den anhaltenden Einfluss der Politik und auf notwendige strukturelle Änderungen 
eingegangen. 
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